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28 December 1982

USSR REPORT
USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 9, September 1982

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TRAGEDY OF LEBANON

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[Article by K. N. Brutents]

[Text] The Middle East has been one of the most explosive regions in the world for decades, virtually throughout the postwar period. The constant tension, bloody wars, illegal occupation of Arab lands by Israel and lack of progress in the efforts to find a fair solution to the Palestinian problem are doing more than just keeping the people of the Middle East from solving the urgent and quite pressing economic and social problems of this region. This kind of political climate in a region of worldwide geopolitical, strategic and economic significance poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

This is fully corroborated by the recent events in and around Lebanon. It is significant, however, that the events in Lebanon--or, more precisely, the tragedy of Lebanon--did not simply add another, more bloody item to the long list of Israeli aggressive actions backed up by American support and protection. They clearly indicate the escalation of Israel's expansionist, aggressive treatment of its Arab neighbors and the escalation of U.S. support for Israel. They attest to the unprecedented ruthlessness and contempt with which this policy line is being pursued. The world public was shocked by the scales of the tragedy in the small Arab country, by the brutality and cynicism of the aggressor who invaded Lebanon--a neighboring sovereign state which has never displayed any kind of hostility toward Israel. Densely populated neighborhoods in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, and other cities were the target of merciless attacks. Hundreds of thousands of missiles and artillery shells and phosphorous, ball-bearing and cluster bombs rained down on the heads of civilians. Most of the aggressor's victims were children, women and the elderly. Tens of thousands of people were killed and injured. Ancient centers of human civilization--the cities of Tyre, Sidon and others--were virtually wiped out. The material damages caused by occupation troops are so great that they still have not been calculated.

The aggressor is flouting the elementary standards of international law, displaying contempt for the wishes of the international community and ignoring the Security Council decisions demanding the cessation of aggression and the removal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. It is also indicative that when Israel began its invasion of Lebanon, it attacked the UN troops that were temporarily stationed in the south of

this country in accordance with a Security Council decision. The Israeli military machine deliberately attacked the majority of diplomatic buildings in West Beirut, including the embassies of France, Canada, Bulgaria, Kuwait, the Soviet Union and other countries. On the pages of the world press and in statements by public spokesmen and cultural figures the evil actions committed by the invaders on Lebanese land and in Beirut are frequently compared to the World War II crimes of the Nazis.

All of this naturally raises questions about how Israel was able to commit these actions. This is certainly not idle curiosity. The answers to these questions can probably shed some light on some current international developments.

It would obviously be wrong to explain Israel's present behavior only by the fact that extremist politicians who have almost lost touch with reality, like M. Begin, A. Sharon and others, who have been blinded by the chauvinistic vision of "great Israel" and who are prepared to do anything to materialize it, have been in power in this country for several years now. Although this is an important factor, it is probable that a more significant role in the determination of the Israeli leadership's policy has been played by the current U.S. Administration's global policy of confrontation and the escalation of international tension--both in general and in specific parts of the world. In Washington's "forceful line" and militaristic approach, Tel Aviv finds a "source of inspiration" and an "example to follow." The same "forceful line" is the reason for the U.S. complicity in, and support of, Israel's piratical military behavior, which the United States is using to advance its own political plans in the Middle East. Without this support, the Israeli actions would be unthinkable, or at least would be quickly nipped in the bud. After all, it is a fact that the United States sabotaged the Security Council's attempts to resolutely counteract aggression and take steps to normalize the situation, even going so far as to veto a resolution proposed by France, its NATO ally. After all, it is a fact that the United States, which has a variety of ways of influencing Israel's behavior, did not make the slightest move to halt the aggression. Furthermore, American officials have hastened to deny all reports in the press that the United States was "pressuring" Israel. Can this be called anything other than patronage and complicity? It was with good reason that L. I. Brezhnev's message to U.S. President R. Reagan, published 3 August 1982, emphasized that "the tragedy of Lebanon, and particularly the inhabitants of its capital, will be an indelible stain on the conscience of those who could have stopped the aggressor but did not."

Another fact is also significant. There is no question that Tel Aviv's uncereemonious behavior is also fostered by the extremely weak opposition to Israel in the Arab world, the definite passivity displayed by many Arab states at this dramatic time in this world and the absence of even the degree of unity that would make an Arab "summit" conference possible. There is no doubt that among other factors this is the result of the Camp David agreements, which took the largest Arab country, Egypt, out of the ranks of the Arab world and created a secure Sinai rear for Israel's aggression. It is also the result of the persistent U.S. attempts to isolate and divide the Arabs and to incite conflicts and discord among Arab states.

By doing this, the United States hopes to weaken the position of the Arab forces opposing the capitulating Camp David line and to advance its own plans to involve other Arab states in the Camp David bargain. According to the same plans, the

destruction of the Palestinian resistance movement and its vanguard, the PLO, would impose a neocolonial variety of "administrative autonomy" on the inhabitants of the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip in preparation for their annexation. Finally, the United States wants to make use of Israeli intervention to expand its own military presence in the Middle East.

The development of the Israeli aggression and the entire course of events and around Lebanon provide conclusive proof that this was a carefully planned and coordinated operation with far-reaching goals connected with the U.S. and Israeli plans directed against the independent Arab states and the Arab national liberation movement. The immediate goals are to crush the Palestinian resistance movement (and the PLO), foist a pro-American government on Lebanon and deal painful blows to the present regime in Syria.

The events in and around Lebanon clearly demonstrate the tragic consequences of the "forceful line" with which U.S. imperialism and its Israeli partner have armed themselves. However, it will be impossible to solve the complex problems in the Middle East, particularly the main problem--the problem of Palestine--with these methods, even if temporary military successes might be possible. Simple common sense suggests that the 4 million Palestinian Arabs who are defending their inalienable right to existence and self-determination, the right to create their own state, a right stipulated in numerous UN decisions, cannot be destroyed. Nor can they be forced to give up their just cause.

By behaving this way in Lebanon, Israeli ruling circles are building mountains of hatred and hostility around their country, and these might eventually crush Israel and the Israelis. Any Israeli politician with an elementary knowledge of history and a sense of responsibility to his own people should realize that a real future for the State of Israel can be based only on cooperation and friendly relations with Arab states, and not on confrontation, not to mention military confrontation. The violent atmosphere Tel Aviv is spreading is only postponing the achievement of a truly just settlement in the Middle East, without which the peace and secure existence of all the people living here cannot be guaranteed.

The cost of Washington's support of Israeli adventuristic behavior is quite high for the United States. In the Arab mind, American policy is closely associated with the crimes committed by the Israeli military establishment in Lebanon. Under these conditions, and this is acknowledged everywhere, anti-American feelings are growing stronger in the Arab countries, including those with regimes seeking cooperation with the United States. Sensible politicians and specialists in the United States are understandably wondering whether it is really in the national interest--if, of course, this interest is not equated with the interests of the Zionist lobby--to continue Washington's onesided support of extremist Israeli circles, to ignore the legitimate wishes and rights of Arabs and to view the Middle East as a field of cold war against the socialist states.

Recognition of the futility of this line with regard to the resolution of the Palestinian issue and other problems in the Middle East is also growing in Western Europe. This process became particularly apparent after the Israeli attack on Lebanon. It is no coincidence that virtually all of the West European states have dissociated themselves from the U.S. position of unconditional support for

Israeli actions and have objected to the aggression, though not always consistently. Furthermore, it is an indisputable fact that sympathy for the Palestinian Arabs and an interest in their only legal representative, the PLO, are growing in these countries. When FRG Foreign Minister H. D. Genscher spoke at a press conference on 23 July during his official visit to Yugoslavia, he said that "peace in the Middle East can be achieved only if the Palestinian problem is solved." "This is not only our opinion," he said, "it is also the position of the entire European community. The Palestinians have a right to self-determination." In other words, Israel's actions have produced results that are obviously not the ones it anticipated when it resolved to destroy the PLO as a military-political factor and "cancel" the Palestinian problem.

American statesmen often try to "justify" U.S. policy in the Middle East by references to the alleged Soviet "threat" to Western interests here. But the real threat to these interests, including those connected with oil shipments, comes from the other direction. It can be found in Israel's defiant anti-Arab policy and in the unconcealed encouragement of this policy by the United States. It appears that the American Administration has not only lost sight of the real national interests of the United States and its West European allies, but also of its special responsibility, as a great power, to maintain international peace and security.

In the race for immediate, ephemeral "advantages," the United States is essentially preventing the fair and comprehensive settlement of problems in the Middle East. The urgent need for this kind of settlement has been firmly underscored by recent events and is now recognized by almost the entire international community. There is no question that these problems must be solved, and they must be solved fairly and through the collective efforts of all of the sides concerned. The sooner this takes place, the less bloodshed there will be in this long-suffering region and the more quickly its people will have the peace and tranquility they have wanted for so long.

Soviet policy is totally and completely aimed at the achievement of this noble goals. In the Middle East, just as everywhere else, the Soviet Union is not seeking confrontation with the United States, it respects the legitimate interests of other states and it advocates the settlement of all disputes by political means, through negotiation. Although the USSR wholeheartedly supports the just cause of the Arab people and the struggle of the Palestinians for their inalienable national rights, it has no prejudices against any other state in this region. This has been announced several times by the Soviet side at the very highest level.

As soon as the events in Lebanon began, the Soviet Union took a clear and precise position against the Israeli aggression, resolutely condemning it and demanding its cessation and the restoration of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The USSR took active steps to halt the aggression and to assist and support the courageous Palestinian patriots, Lebanese national patriotic forces and Syria. The tragedy of Lebanon and the entire situation in the Middle East today demonstrate once again, as vividly as possible, how urgent and immediate the need is for effective measures to overcome the dangerous impasse in the Middle East settlement process. The implementation of the Soviet Union's well-known proposal of an international conference on the Middle East could be a valuable step in this direction.

The Soviet Union will continue to do everything within its power to erect strong barriers against aggressive behavior in the Middle East to bring about a just and lasting peace, based on respect for the rights and interests of all the people living in this region.

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RESTRICTIONS ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH USSR ASSAILED

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[Article by A. I. Shapiro: Global Economic Problems and Soviet-American Relations"]

[Text] The global problems of the present day are becoming an increasingly large part of the complex and contradictory system of international relations. These problems transcend the sphere of U.S. and Soviet influence and affect far more than the vital interests of these two countries. In recent decades they have taken on worldwide dimensions, have become particularly acute and urgent and are affecting the development of all peoples and all states. To a considerable extent, they will determine the future of the entire human race. "In the future," a speaker pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, "they will have an increasingly perceptible effect on the life of each nation and on the entire system of international relations."¹

Although the category of "global problems" and the term itself were not widely used by scholars until recently, they are already the subject of a vast amount of literature.² For this reason, the author of this article will simply examine the role these problems, primarily economic issues, play in Soviet-American relations and the role they are expected to play. The course and directions of world development, including the possibility of alleviating global problems, depend greatly on the policies of the two largest industrial states.

Regrettably, however, the significance of Soviet-American cooperation in this sphere now has to be discussed from the theoretical standpoint rather than the practical one. Now that the U.S. Administration has completed its abrupt reversal from detente to the escalation of international tension and has chosen to disregard the universally acceptable legal and ethical standards of intergovernmental relations, it is trying to substitute "sanctions" for normal relations between these countries and is making use of all natural contacts and negotiations, including those connected with decisions on global problems, as occasions for authoritarian behavior and threats. However, "objectively speaking, the further intensification of the international atmosphere, the escalation of the arms race and the disruption of normal contacts between states can bring no good to anyone. This naturally includes the Americans," L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 17th Congress of USSR trade unions. "This can, however, cause all mankind to suffer greatly."³ The failure to solve problems which can be classified as global poses the most serious threat to world civilization. This is the reason for the urgent need for immediate action, quick decisions and effective measures to alleviate and eliminate these problems.

International Cooperation--An Imperative of Our Time

The direct examination of the place occupied in Soviet-American relations by problems which are now categorized as global should be preceded by a brief description of these problems and their approximate classification. Despite all of their variety and diversity and the differences in their nature, content and form, these problems can conditionally be divided into three groups. The first group is connected with relations between the main opposing socioeconomic communities in today's world--the worldwide socialist system and the worldwide capitalist system--and the countries making them up. Soviet researchers V. V. Zagladin and I. T. Frolov call the global problems in this group "intersocial."⁴ The main ones are the problems of war and peace, on which the very existence of the human race depends, and the problem of overcoming the centuries-old backwardness engendered by colonialism and neocolonialism in the Asian, African and Latin American countries, without which the development of civilization and the constant advancement of world productive forces would be unthinkable.

The second group consists of problems in supplying society with the vital necessities. These problems arose in the sphere of man's relations with nature. These are the problems of providing hundreds of millions of people with sources of energy and raw materials at a time of continuous population growth; of eradicating all hunger and poverty on earth; of establishing a fundamentally new ecological situation--that is, the interrelated problems of the intelligent and comprehensive use of natural resources, the preservation of the biosphere, the establishment and maintenance of the necessary balance in planetary and regional ecosystems, the production of food, the consumption of non-renewable natural resources, the exploration of space and the extensive use of world ocean resources.

The third group consists of problems which have been made acute by conflicts in man's interaction with society. These problems include the most significant aspects of the technological revolution, which largely determine tendencies in the spheres of science, culture, education and health (particularly the prevention and elimination of the most dangerous and common illnesses), as well as transportation and communications, and so forth. They include the need for a more active and more efficient demographic policy and, finally, the harmonious development of man himself, with the guarantee of a fitting future for the human race.

All of these problems arose and developed in different areas, including the social sphere and various other spheres of human life. Their influence now extends to the most important aspects of world economics and international relations and have strongly influenced the development of productive forces, the state of the environment and the individual's relationship to society. The unparalleled intensification and complication of problems which existed in the past but have now evolved from local issues into planetary ones, just as the appearance of qualitatively new problems, are the direct result of the rapid internationalization of social life, production, science, technology and so forth. This is a reflection of the "unity and cohesiveness, the interdependence and integrity of the world process."⁵ Today all natural geographic and economic, social and political, military and ideological factors of world development and processes occurring within countries and throughout the world have combined to make up a tight knot.

Today's global problems are interconnected. In fact, they are so closely interwoven in an intricate knot of conflicting interests and relationships that the separate, autonomous resolution of any one problem will be virtually impossible. They have become apparent not in one country, one isolated region or even one continent, but throughout the world, and they therefore can and must be solved only as a group, and not separately. Overcoming them will require joint efforts by all peoples and countries, broad-scale planned and constructive international economic, scientific, technical, ecological and, consequently, political cooperation, and collective measures by all states regardless of their social structure. Separate actions by individual states, groups of states or even regions will obviously not be enough. There is only one way of solving or alleviating global problems: a combination of internal efforts by each country, guaranteeing the most effective socioeconomic development of that country, and international cooperation on the bilateral, multilateral, regional and global levels, with the active participation of truly international institutions.

This conclusion is not formally disputed in the reports "Entering the Twenty-First Century" and "The Future of the World: Time to Act," submitted in 1980 and 1981 to the U.S. President on his orders by the Council on Environmental Quality, the State Department and 11 other government agencies. The first of these reports is described as "the most complete and coordinated picture ever painted by the U.S. Government."⁶ This picture is far from optimistic; it reveals the serious difficulties and conflicts that might be encountered by the United States, and by the entire world, in coming decades. It stresses that the changes needed in politics "are far beyond the abilities of any one nation" and that "an era of unprecedented cooperation and collective commitment" must begin. The authors of the report feel that "the world will enter the 21st century in an extremely unhealthy state unless nations--collectively and individually" plan and take impressive steps to improve social and economic conditions and the management of resources and environmental protection and lower the birth rate." Both reports say that the U.S. Government needs a special mechanism to study global problems and their implications and propose the creation of this kind of agency in the executive branch.⁷

Marxism-Leninism believes that the optimal resolution of global problems can only be accomplished when social relations have been radically reformed throughout the world and when the worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism and communism has been completed. The genuine resolution of conflicts between individuals, between the individual and the group, and between man and nature, K. Marx wrote, will be guaranteed by communism.⁸

As long as imperialism exists, the threat of "major war" will exist, and American and other transnational corporations will continue to rob the people of the former colonies and semicolonies. It was precisely the property relations that were inherent in highly developed state-monopoly capitalism that turned fuel, energy, raw material, food, ecological and other problems into acute crises. The capitalist way of using nature, despite the measures taken to protect the environment, is giving rise to more and more new social and national antagonism; it has opened another front of class struggle in the United States and other capitalist countries and has exacerbated sociopolitical crises in these countries.

The chronic crisis form taken by global economic problems in the United States and in other capitalist countries was made inevitable not by the contradictions of human civilization in general, but by the antagonisms of bourgeois civilization and the nature of the capitalist development of productive forces, science, technology and social relations. "Capitalist production...", K. Marx wrote, "develops technology and a system for the social process of production only in such a way that it simultaneously undermines the sources of all wealth: the earth and the worker."⁹ These features of capitalism have been compounded in our day by the technological revolution and the state-monopoly organization of bourgeois society. It has become increasingly clear that American state-monopoly capitalism is incapable of managing productive forces without creating the most serious dangers for nature, and consequently for society itself, which is connected to nature by innumerable bonds. This destroys nature's automatic stabilizers and protective mechanisms, intensifies disparities and imbalances and gives rise to shortages of various natural and ecological resources.

There is no question that the development of world productive forces and its consequences have certain common features and trends, and in this sense they are international. However, under socialism, especially mature socialism, contradictions between man and nature do not signify an unavoidable "crisis syndrome." On the contrary, the developed socialist society creates the necessary objective conditions for the successful resolution of the most complex global problems.

Of course, this does not mean that the days of the socialist community are free of ecological, energy and raw material problems or that the negative aspects of civilization's interaction with nature and some negative consequences of technological progress no longer exist. No matter what kind of slanderous statements might be made about the policy and practice of socialism by anticommunist ideologists like M. Goldman¹⁰ and other "Sovietologists," the contradictions of the socialist use of nature cannot be compared in any way with the structural crises in the ecological sphere in the United States and the capitalist world in general.

Nevertheless, even while much of the world is still capitalist, during the relatively long transition period of peaceful coexistence and confrontation between the two social systems, certain preventive measures and specific steps can certainly be taken for at least the partial improvement of the ecological situation, the protection of the environment, the alleviation of insurmountable and explosive crises and, in the future, even the prevention of these crises. Objectively, the danger of war can be eliminated, peace can be maintained, the economic growth of young national states could be relatively quicker and a broader struggle could be launched against the hunger and malnutrition of millions of people in the world and against communicable diseases. Even if this would only be a palliative, and not a radical solution, it would be a reasonable and necessary palliative. There is no alternative to this at a time when mankind is divided into two social poles, and the capitalist world is divided into imperialist states and developing countries, at a time when the monopolies have set themselves up in opposition to the overwhelming majority of nations in the very centers of imperialism.

There is no other way to resolve these problems than to work out a single global strategy for the elimination of global problems, based on a qualitatively new approach to them, consistent with their essence. This will be far from a simple

matter given the social and class heterogeneity of today's world and the fundamental difference between two approaches to these problems--Marxist-Leninist and bourgeois. Ideological differences certainly do not preclude productive dialogue, the search for mutually acceptable solutions and the development of a platform for joint action. In spite of the extreme difficulty of providing the earth's population with all its needs, this is completely possible because the technological revolution, which has accelerated the development of productive forces and has radically changed the course of their development, has not only given rise to new needs and new conflicts between man and nature, but has also created the necessary conditions for their elimination.

For this reason, genuine international cooperation in an atmosphere of peace and detente, aimed at compounding the scientific, technical and available economic prerequisites for the elimination of conflicts between civilization and the environment, the unification of the efforts of all mankind for this purpose, and not confrontation, is now a categorical imperative. Without this, global problems cannot be eliminated or even alleviated.

Conflicting Approaches

When international cooperation is discussed as the only means of eventually solving global problems and its potential positive results are calculated, it is understood that this cooperation must be based on mutual benefits and the equality of all participants, that it must make use of the advantages of international division of labor and that it must be free of national egotism, hegemonism and expansionist aspirations. The U.S. Government documents published in recent years in connection with these problems, however, are permeated with ambitious imperial claims to "world leadership."

An example of this can be found in the previously mentioned report prepared by American Government agencies, "Entering the Twenty-First Century," which claims to present a "strictly scientific" and objective analysis. Placing the United States above the world, because it "has the largest economy," and extolling its "superiority" to all other countries, the authors preach the *idee fixe* about American imperialism as the world leader. They frankly say that the United States "can expect its policy to be the prevailing influence on global development"¹¹ and that it has "extremely strong grounds for this expectation." Statements like this, which are being encountered with increased frequency in American official declarations, are actually nothing other than a refusal to participate in international cooperation, since the "principles" on which this tendency toward authoritarianism is based would obviously make it unthinkable.

The Soviet position is a totally different one. The Soviet Union views itself not as some kind of isolated sociopolitical organism, but as an integral part of modern civilization, whose achievements belong to all mankind. Like the rest of the socialist community, the USSR is setting an example, by means of its internal development and its approach to international relations, of how the major problems that are now facing peoples and governments should be solved. Our country takes an active and positive stand in its approach to these problems and advocates their intelligent and collective resolution through equal and economically expedient cooperation. This is the purpose of the Leninist foreign policy line of peaceful

coexistence. No other state has presented mankind with such a broad spectrum of specific and realistic initiatives on major global problems as the Soviet Union has done and is still doing.

The positive aspects of Soviet policy include an unparalleled and tirelessly implemented strategy of peace and support for national liberation revolutions and movements and for the struggle of the developing countries for the reorganization of international economic relations on a fair and democratic basis. They also include the scientific elaboration of the principles of man's interaction with nature and a willingness to act in conjunction with other states on the resolution of energy, ecological and transportation problems and the planning and completion of large-scale technological progress and projects. This is attested to, for example, by the Soviet Union's role in the study of outer space and the world ocean, in the activities of the World Meteorological Organization and World Health Organization and in many other areas. Specific proposals and recommendations in these areas constitute an integral part of the Program of Peace worked out by the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU congresses and have been submitted to the world community through the United Nations and its specialized organizations. All of this clearly testifies that the USSR and real socialism express the wishes of all peoples and are acting in the true interests of mankind.

It is obvious, therefore, that the approaches of the USSR and the United States to peaceful international cooperation on a multilateral basis are totally different. This difference is naturally having a negative effect on their bilateral relations with regard to global problems. In view of the major role the two states play in world economics and world politics, these relations occupy a special place in the establishment and development of international cooperation, including cooperation in this area. All of the falsity of the concept of the "two superpowers," which is thoroughly imperialist in its essence, regardless of the persons by whom or the means by which it is propounded, is quite obvious within the context of the diametrically opposed Soviet and U.S. approaches to international cooperation on a multilateral basis and to their bilateral relations, just as in other areas.

Nevertheless, it is no secret that the Soviet Union and the United States, which belong to opposing world social systems, are the world leaders. Both countries cover a vast territory, have a large population and possess exceedingly rich and diverse natural resources, which are the basis of their highly developed industrial and multisectorial economy with a modern production structure. They have colossal economic, scientific and technical potential, highly skilled manpower, all or almost all types of functional economic complexes, branches and subbranches of physical production and technically well-equipped agriculture and transportation. They surpass all other countries in terms of economic dimensions.

The United States accounts for one-fourth of the world industrial product and the USSR accounts for one-fifth. The list of major commodities in whose manufacture the Soviet Union has caught up with its rival in economic competition or has surpassed this rival and is now the world leader is becoming increasingly impressive. The combined human resources employed in the scientific sphere in these two countries represent half of the world's scientific manpower. The achievements of an approximate balance of military strength, a strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, was a historic conquest for

real socialism. This is objectively serving to keep the peace, contain the ambitions of imperialist aggressive forces and lay a solid foundation for the cessation of the arms race and progression toward disarmament.

All of this is the reason not only for the general connection between the international situation and the policies of the two largest powers, but also their primary role in the elimination of the serious and real dangers that are now threatening our planet and in the guaranteed advancement of human society. However, to carry out this mission, which has objectively been assigned to them by history, they must establish and develop normal relations, based on mutual trust, respect and consideration for one another's rights and interests. This is a two-sided problem, depending on the USSR and on the United States.

As for the Soviet Union, its leaders have stated several times that the USSR sincerely wants normal, or even cordial and friendly, relations with the United States and cooperation for the sake of world peace and the resolution or alleviation of global problems. From the standpoint of the interests of the populations of these two countries and of all mankind, there is no other reasonable alternative. This long-term policy, which is not influenced by temporary considerations, is the principled line of our party. Although there are differences in the class nature and ideology of the two states, the USSR firmly intends to settle all disputes and disagreements not by force, not by threats and saber-rattling, but by peaceful political means, by negotiation. As a speaker noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, the state of Soviet-U.S. relations "at the present time and the severity of the international problems that must be solved dictate, in our opinion, the need for dialogue on all levels, and it must be active dialogue. We are ready for this dialogue."¹² The USSR has consistently tried to improve Soviet-American economic and political relations in strict accordance with the spirit and letter of the treaties, agreements and commitments negotiated during the period of detente.

The United States is adhering to a totally different policy line. It is true that President Reagan periodically makes comments about "the maintenance of constructive and mutually beneficial relations with the Soviet Union," but these are still purely verbal declarations, having nothing in common with the actual behavior of the U.S. Government. Continuing the Carter Administration's destruction of all of the early positive achievements, which took so much work and colossal joint effort, in the sphere of Soviet-American relations, the present administration has reversed the course of bilateral ties even more dramatically in several fields. This has undermined the fundamental agreements recorded in the extremely important document, the "Fundamentals of Interrelations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America," which laid a solid political and legal basis for the development of cooperation by the two powers in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence. "We are not troubled much by the 1972 agreements even if both sides consented to them," U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig said frankly not long before his resignation.

Washington's Onesided Behavior

It is true that the American Government has, in effect, unilaterally renounced some earlier agreements and commitments by declining to renew them when the 5-year term expired at the end of the 1970's and that it cut off talks on several matters,

thereby proving to be an extremely unreliable and flighty partner with whom a relationship cannot be conducted on a long-term basis. This was the fate, in particular, of several agreements concluded by the USSR and United States in the sphere of global problems, and this actually nullified the budding cooperation between the two countries with regard to a fairly broad group of these problems.

This cooperation seemed promising at the beginning, however. In fact, if we exclude the treaties and agreements of the 1950's and 1960's, which were quite limited and short-lived (they usually expired within 2 years) and the sporadic contacts and exchanges of that time, we can regard the first intergovernmental agreement in the history of Soviet-American relations on cooperation in science and technology, signed in May 1972, at the time of the first of the four summit meetings held in the 1972-1974 period, as the beginning of this cooperation. The purpose of the cooperation, this document said, was to create "broad opportunities to unite the efforts of scientists and specialists from both countries in important projects to promote scientific and technical progress for the good of both countries and all humanity."¹³ This was an acknowledgment of the mutually beneficial nature of scientific, technical and economic ties and their correspondence to the common objectives of the people of both countries, equally interested in the resolution of global problems and the accelerated development of productive forces by means of mutually beneficial international division of labor.

In all, 11 intergovernmental Soviet-American agreements had been signed by the middle of 1974 on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy, the study of the world ocean, the study and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, environmental protection, oceanography, agriculture, power engineering, transportation, residential and other types of construction, medicine and public health. A mechanism was created for the implementation of these agreements--joint bilateral commissions on technological cooperation in general and on each specific field were created, as well as 56 task forces in charge of specific scientific and technical programs, which numbered more than 300 by 1979.

These are obviously spheres which pertain directly to the global problems that are worrying the people of the USSR and the United States and all mankind. The connection between the resolution of these problems and the scientific and technical progress of society is reaffirmed in L. I. Brezhnev's message to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. "The colossal feats which were made possible by the creative and technical genius of mankind will allow people to begin a new chapter in their history," the message said. "There are already truly boundless possibilities for the resolution of such worldwide problems as the struggle against hunger, disease, poverty and many others. But this will mean that technological progress must be placed exclusively at the service of the peaceful aspirations of people."¹⁴

The Soviet-American cooperation in environmental protection took the form of 41 joint projects in 11 fields. Cooperation in power engineering was concentrated in three areas: controlled thermonuclear synthesis, fast-neutron breeders and the fundamental properties of matter. Agricultural cooperation touched on such important areas as selection, the cultivation and protection of crops, methods of enhancing the productivity of livestock and poultry and the mechanization of production. The agreement on transportation envisaged cooperation in the construction of bridges and tunnels, the study of high-speed railway transport, the

enhancement of the efficiency and safety of civil aviation and motor transport and the technology of maritime transport and the handling of cargo in ports. The joint efforts in space travel were crowned by the experimental flight of the "Soyuz" and "Apollo" spacecrafts in 1975. More than 30 Soviet and American institutes and laboratories took part in studies of the world ocean, and 9 joint expeditions, 10 seminars and conferences attended by more than 500 scientists from both countries were held.¹⁵

In addition to the intergovernmental agreements, the State Committee of the USSR for Science and Technology concluded agreements with large American scientific establishments and industrial corporations. The number of these agreements rose from just over 40 in 1975 to 72 in 1981.

By effectively erasing its signature from many intergovernmental Soviet-American documents, limiting contacts between firms and organizations and moving from constructive dialogue and cooperation with the USSR to a policy of confrontation, the U.S. Government has used various pretexts to bring about the complete curtailment of economic, scientific and technical ties and contacts with the Soviet Union.

On 4 January 1980, for example, the Carter Administration unilaterally restricted Soviet-American cooperation in a number of fields, which experience had proved to be useful and effective for both sides. The joint commissions on technological cooperation and power engineering have not met since 1979, although they are supposed to meet annually. Meetings of other commissions and sessions of task forces have been postponed indefinitely, and exchanges of ministerial and departmental delegations have been canceled. The American side has sharply restricted the funding available for cooperation between the U.S. National Academy of Arts and Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences. In such spheres as power engineering, agriculture and construction, joint projects have been virtually halted, in others they have been subjected to sharp cuts, and they have been retained in their entirety only in the areas of environmental protection, medicine and public health.

In the very last days of 1981 the United States announced its intention to postpone the talks on the new bilateral agreement on shipping and effectively canceled agreements on scientific exchanges in the study of the world ocean, energy reserves, etc. On 20 January 1982 Washington extended its "sanctions" to all contacts between Soviet and American scientists. Ronald Reagan refused to renew the agreement on technological cooperation, which expired in May 1982, as well as the agreement on cooperation in power engineering, and announced his intention to reconsider all other Soviet-American agreements, particularly those pertaining to global problems,

On 19 June 1982 the U.S. National Security Council resolved that it would not cancel, but would actually expand, the ban imposed at the end of 1981 on shipments of oil and gas extraction equipment to the Soviet Union. Now it also extends to the products of foreign branches of U.S. corporations, as well as foreign companies manufacturing this kind of equipment on American licenses. It has been estimated that these corporations will lose a total of 1.2 billion dollars by the end of 1985. This decision, which is permeated with the spirit of economic warfare

against the Soviet Union and against the United States' Western European allies, will not only hurt supplier firms. It will ruin the prospect of solving the acute global energy crisis, and not only in Western Europe but in the rest of the world as well. After all, this is equipment which will be used to install the pipeline between Siberia and Western Europe, the "transaction of the era" which will extend into the 21st century, has an estimated cost of 15 billion dollars and should alleviate the energy difficulties of several large capitalist states and also create many new jobs in these states.

Acting according to the "Pax Americana" formula, American ruling circles have turned the practice of responding to any Soviet steps which they deem "undesirable" with economic "sanctions," all types of embargoes, political blackmail and attempts to exert pressure on our country, into some kind of stupid tradition. Past events, however, have always corroborated the accuracy of V. I. Lenin's well-known words: "With regard to the blockade, experience has shown that we cannot know which side it will harm the most: the blocking side or the blocked one."¹⁶ Attempts to put the Soviet Union under economic "quarantine" cost the United States something and are not in the interests of the American people. The ban on exports of highly complex technological equipment to the USSR, as well as other products that circulate freely in the world market, is taking hundreds of thousands of jobs away from the American working public, thereby exacerbating the already severe unemployment problem. These prohibitions have also been protested loudly by the corporations that had concluded mutually beneficial contracts for hundreds of millions of dollars with Soviet foreign trade organizations. They include such companies as Caterpillar Tractor, General Electric, Control Data, Hope Industries, Dresser Industries, Occidental Petroleum, Armco Steel and North American Car (the losses of just the latter exceeded 200 million dollars).

In a report published in 1982 the U.S. National Science Foundation actually refuted the official Washington view that Soviet-American economic cooperation supposedly benefits only the USSR. It acknowledged the importance of the contribution of Soviet specialists to the resolution of complex scientific and technical problems and reaffirmed the fact that American scientists have something to learn from their Soviet colleagues. Even members of the administration, particularly the Secretary of Agriculture J. Block, have had to admit that the U.S. attempts to exert economic pressure on the Soviet Union have rebounded primarily against the United States itself.

This naturally brings to mind F. Engel's statement in "Notes for a Criticism of Political Economy"--his first economic work, which K. Marx called "a brilliant first draft of a criticism of economic categories": "The nation which arouses hostile feelings toward itself in its suppliers and clients is behaving quite foolishly. The friendlier relations are, the more it will benefit. This is what constitutes the humaneness of trade."¹⁸

The plans of American opponents of detente and cooperation to use force to undermine the Soviet economy, disrupt the economic life of our country and thereby gain political concessions turned out to be, just as in the past, futile. The USSR has enough economic strength to counteract any intrigues by imperialist forces, including the "crusade" against socialism which President Reagan has

ordered. J. J. Servan-Schreiber remarked, although in another connection, that "the embargo can only be effective if it is universal."¹⁹ But the American embargo is not, because Western Europe, Japan and other countries have not expressed any willingness to become involved in it.

The efforts made by the U.S. President at conferences of the "big seven" in Ottawa (July 1981) and Versailles (June 1982) to convince his partners to curtail economic contacts with the USSR and cooperation with it in areas pertaining to global problems have obviously been unsuccessful to date. This is attested to, in particular, by the refusal of the Western European leaders to follow in the wake of the egotistical American policy of sabotaging the "gas for pipes" contract and replacing it with exports of costly coal from the United States to Western Europe. "This action, which was taken without any kind of consultations with the European Economic Community," a resolution of the EEC Council says, "reflects the extraterritorial application of American laws, which contradict the principles of international law in this case and are consequently unacceptable to the community."

The Soviet Union is willing to establish broader equal and mutually beneficial economic ties with the United States and other capitalist countries. At the same time, when it makes foreign economic policy, it obviously must consider the fact that the United States and the governments acting in unison with the American Administration are becoming unreliable partners. The USSR, a speaker noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, is relying, as it always has and always will, primarily on its own strength in fundamental matters of economic development, and this strength is sufficient to keep important links of the Soviet national economy from growing dependent on imports of various goods from the capitalist states. At the congress, President A. P. Aleksandrov of the USSR Academy of Sciences said: "By imposing an embargo on some materials and types of technology, the United States hoped to impede our progress. But it was mistaken. We quickly stepped up our own development projects."²⁰

In essence, the USSR food program for the period up to 1990--the program to enhance the well-being of the Soviet people and ensure the uninterrupted provision of the population with all types of foodstuffs and the considerable improvement of the diet by increasing the consumption of the most valuable products, is based on the mobilization of internal resources. This program, which was ratified by the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, represents the most important element of party economic strategy for the 1980's. Making maximum use of its own abilities, the Soviet Union has no intention of giving up what foreign trade can do to augment our food resources--naturally, with a view to economic expediency. Quite naturally, the program envisages cooperation in this area with foreign countries, especially the socialist states. In particular, contacts with CEMA countries in agricultural production and the processing and efficient use of raw materials are to be intensified in line with long-range special programs.

The interests of our state demand, a speaker stressed at the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum, that we have enough of our own food and fodder resources to guard us against any kind of mishap. In recent years, our poor weather has been one of the main reasons why we have had to purchase grain, meat and some other products abroad in the public interest. However, the leaders of some states, especially

the United States, are trying to turn ordinary commercial operations--for example, grain sales--into a means of influencing our country and an instrument of political pressure. The Reagan Administration wants, even more than its predecessors, to use agricultural exports in its own political interests. We have never put up with this and we never will. The food program is based on the belief that less food must be imported from the capitalist countries.

At the 36th CEMA Session in June 1982 in Budapest, speakers noted that the experience of the past few years has motivated the countries of the socialist community to strive for, even stronger unity and consolidate their technological and economic independence.²¹ This, of course, does not suggest a trend toward autarchy or toward isolation from the capitalist part of the world economy, but the even closer economic unification of the socialist countries, ensuring strong and equal economic interrelations at times when certain imperialist forces try to pursue a policy of discrimination and authoritarianism.

The global confrontation with communism and the anti-Sovietism that abound in the terminology and the actual policy of the Reagan White House, as well as Washington's attempts to change the military-strategic balance with the USSR in its own favor--all of this is naturally most clearly reflected in the issue of war and peace. In the hierarchy of global problems, it occupies a special, prominent position. Soviet scholar G. Kh. Shakhnazarov regards them as a "sub-theme" of the theme of peace, and he categorizes peace as one of the multifaceted and multidimensional concepts--or, more precisely, "supraconcepts"--whose essence is revealed through several other categories.²² It is certainly true that peace is the most important prerequisite and the primary condition for the resolution of all other global problems, all of the urgent objectives of modern civilization, on which both the present and the future of humanity depend. Unless peace is preserved and consolidated and a worldwide thermonuclear catastrophe is prevented, the very discussion of other global problems would be a futile endeavor.

By whipping up war hysteria and imposing a new and unprecedented round of the arms race on mankind, the United States is depriving it of an extremely substantial source of well-being and an opportunity to overcome today's pressing problems. The armament mills are devouring the funds needed to provide people with food, develop fundamentally new sources of energy, explore the ocean and outer space, eliminate disease and protect the environment. The arms race is seriously complicating the attainment of these objectives, which are common to all people. Even in the United States the new dimensions of the arms race are being financed by the Reagan Administration's sharp cuts in social programs and sweeping attack on the standard of living, status and rights of the working public.

The arms race is also depriving the newly liberated countries of a significant reserve for the accelerated economic growth and higher standard of living they need so much. It has been calculated that the gap between the industrial nations and the newly liberated countries in terms of per capita gross national product is equivalent to 13:1. The young national states cannot cross this deep abyss without outside assistance. The complexity of the tasks lying ahead for them is compounded at a time when their foreign debt, according to OECD data, is far in excess of 500 billion dollars. The international economic strategy outlined in the program for the second UN decade of development indicated that these countries

need government-channeled aid amounting to 0.7 percent of the gross national product of the developed countries, although even this, it has now been demonstrated, will not produce the desired result within the next 20-30 years. In the United States, however, this indicator is now only 0.18 percent,²³ and Washington does not intend to increase aid for development purposes, preferring to allow the transnational corporations to continue robbing the newly liberated countries, and will rely on military strength, intimidation and blackmail if a crisis should develop in its relations with these countries.

Washington's destructive approach to the resolution of international problems, especially global problems, and the policy of the present American Administration in this sphere are also injuring mankind severely in another sense. After all, the processes occurring in a particular state, especially one like the United States, affect other countries and the worldwide ecological or energy situation. Nevertheless, acting in the interests of the grand bourgeoisie, especially the monopolistic segment, and refusing to spend money on antipollution equipment, Ronald Reagan canceled many earlier environmental regulations almost within the first few days after he entered the White House, and Secretary of the Interior J. Watt launched an assault against nature and its inhabitants. In view of the fact that ecology knows no national boundaries and the atmosphere of our planet is indivisible, the continued deterioration of the environment in the United States will have an adverse effect on its closest neighbors--Canada and Mexico--and on many other states and the international ecological situation in general.

All of this has been illustrated numerous times by the interconnection and interdependence of various global problems and the consequent objective need for concerted action by countries and peoples for their resolution. The balance of economic and political power in the world and in the capitalist zone is still changing, and not in favor of the United States, which is gradually losing its past influence. "There is no question that the world political climate depends largely on the state of Soviet-American relations," L. I. Brezhnev said. "But this is not the whole truth. Other states, including the European countries, also carry a great deal of political weight in the resolution of world problems. Their vote could be the deciding one."²⁴

Washington's attempts to subvert mutually beneficial economic cooperation by countries of the two social systems in general and cooperation in the resolution of global problems in particular, and its plans to turn world economic ties into an instrument of political blackmail are inconsistent with the objective tendency of the world economy to develop as a single entity. This policy can only intensify the difficulties and contradictions of the capitalist world economy and exacerbate the competitive struggle of capitalist monopolies and states.

FOOTNOTES

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3. KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1982, p 21.
 4. V. V. Zagladin and I. T. Frolov, Op. cit., p 36.
 5. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 29, p 135.
 6. "The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century. Vol One. A Report Prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State. Study Director Gerald O. Barney," Washington, 1980, p III.
 7. Ibid., pp IV, VII, 5, 42.
 8. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 42, p 116.
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 10. M. Goldman, "The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union," Cambridge (Mass.) and London, 1972.
 11. "The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century," p 4.
 12. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 23.
 13. "Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation in the Area of Science and Technology" of 24 May 1972, Art 2, SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1972, p 122.
 14. PRAVDA, 16 June 1982.
 15. For more detail, see "SSSR-SShA: ekonomicheskii otnosheniya. Problemy i vozmozhnosti" [USSR-USA: Economic Relations. Problems and Possibilities], Moscow, 1976, pp 318-361; A. K. Subbotin, "Mirovyie ekonomicheskiye problemy: perspektivnyye resheniya" [World Economic Problems: Long-Range Solutions], Moscow, 1980, pp 188-192.
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 18. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., Vol 1, p 549.
 19. J. J. Servan-Schreiber, "Le Defi Mondial," Paris, 1980, p 27.
 20. PRAVDA, 26 February 1981.

21. Ibid., 9 June 1982.
22. G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "Gryadushchiy miroporyadok" [The Future World Order], Moscow, 1981, pp 182-183.
23. "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics," New York, 1979, p 437; E. Laszlo et al, "Goals for Mankind. A Report to the Club of Rome on the New Horizon of Global Community," New York, 1977, pp 307-308.
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DECLINE OF MAJOR PARTIES' ROLE IN ELECTION SURVEYED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) pp 22-32

[Article by V. O. Pechatnov: "The Two-Party System and Elections"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The two-party system in the United States is experiencing hard times. At the end of the 1960's it entered a lengthy period of decline, marked by the constant contraction of its sphere of influence on the voters, the disintegration of voter coalitions that were once relatively strong and the inability of the two bourgeois parties to propose effective political programs for the resolution of urgent domestic and international problems. The crisis of the two-party system¹ is a symptom of the general ideological and political crisis of bourgeois society, which is "afflicting political institutions and bourgeois political parties and is shattering elementary standards of morality."²

The declining strength of the two-party system--this tried and tested instrument for the maintenance of the political control of U.S. ruling circles over society--is arousing increasing worry in bourgeois ideologists and politicians. Both parties are making more vigorous attempts to counteract destabilizing trends and to adapt to change. In this respect, particularly significant changes have taken place in recent years in an important sphere of activity by the main U.S. political parties--the selection and nomination of candidates for elective offices on all levels and the organization of election campaigns. These changes are greatly affecting campaign practices. They are of particular interest in light of this year's congressional and local elections.

Republicans and Democrats have never been distinguished by any great devotion to ideological principles or organizational unity. However, these parties have traditionally held a monopoly in the performance of the functions of a "personnel department" for the dominant class and a vehicle to deliver specific politicians to positions of power. This, more than anything else, has distinguished them from all other political institutions.³ The decade of the 1970's brought many changes, however, which threatened this monopoly.

Many of these changes were connected with the increasing complexity and rising cost of the "technology" of campaign preparations and practices--the development of increasingly subtle methods of polling public opinion and other means of "voter

market" analysis, new ways of manipulating voters, the widespread use of new computer-aided methods of collecting financial contributions, and the more important role of television advertising in the formation and popularization of the proper "image" for the candidate. Elections in the United States have become an extremely costly undertaking, requiring the combined efforts of many specialists--sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, financiers, television advertising experts, producers, etc.

This is the reason for the dramatic rise in campaign spending, particularly in elections to the U.S. Congress, which are totally financed by private "donors." These expenditures rose from 73.9 million dollars in 1974 to 242.2 million in 1980, and some forecasts put 1982 campaign costs at half a billion dollars. Within just 4 years (1974-1978) the cost of the average campaign for elections to the House of Representatives and Senate more than doubled--respectively, from 54,000 and 437,000 dollars to 109,000 and 951,000.⁴ In turn, these rising costs raised the demand for a highly qualified approach to the planning and conduct of election campaigns.

The parties have not been adapting well to new conditions, and these needs are now being filled more by special firms of political consultants. These firms now make up an entire branch, have become a flourishing American political industry and are beginning to penetrate foreign markets.⁵ The United States now has around 300 such firms, whose services, according to available data, are used by 75 percent of all candidates on the federal and state levels;⁶ they include firms which offer candidates comprehensive service (the leaders are David Garth, Joseph Napoletan, Stuart Spencer and the Bailey and Deerdourff firm) and firms specializing in certain services--voter polls, fund-raising, television commercials, office support, etc.⁷ Political management firms have been most active in the 1982 campaigns. For example, the firm of Bailey and Deerdourff is managing the campaigns of Republican Governors L. Alexander (Tennessee) and R. Thornburgh (Pennsylvania) and Senator R. Lugar (Republican, Indiana). The list of clients of the Hart firm, specializing mainly in polls, is even more impressive: Democratic Senators L. Bentsen (Texas), H. Jackson (Washington), D. DeConcini (Arizona), J. Sasser (Tennessee) and D. Riegle (Michigan) and Governors H. Carey and J. Garrahy.

These new "candidate merchants" have connections with the most diverse sociopolitical forces and groups and are therefore quite diverse in terms of their political sympathies--from R. Parker in California, serving progressive Congressman R. Dellums and the leftist radical SEVEN DAYS magazine, to the notorious R. Viguerie from Virginia, who put an entire band of extreme rightwing politicians in office.

These firms can function within a single party framework and can even specialize in serving individual segments of the Republican and Democratic parties, but they generally act independently of party organizations and have essentially weakened them by taking over their functions in the "manufacture and sale" of candidates. "We have replaced the parties," P. Cadell, head of the Cambridge Survey Research firm and former adviser to President Carter, said, "by proving that candidates can be elected without any help from them." "I have managed many campaigns in many states," one of the captains of the new industry, J. Napoletan, founder and president of the international and American associations of political consultants, said in the same vein, "without knowing even the names of the local party bosses. This was completely irrelevant to me and to my candidates."⁸ It is not surprising that

political consultants in the United States are now being called the "new king-makers"⁹ and, in this capacity, have replaced party bosses like late Mayor R. Daley of Chicago. This change has made campaigns more manipulative, and the new methods of analyzing the voting public and influencing it through the mass media provide much greater opportunities for this than in the past.

Another factor which has diminished the role of the parties in the management of campaigns was the reform of the presidential campaign financing system in accordance with the federal campaign act of 1971 and, in particular, the 1974 and 1976 amendments to this law. This reform envisaged the government funding of campaigns and set new limits on direct contributions and the candidates' own expenditures.¹⁰

The actual consequences of this reform were extremely diverse and were unexpected even for their initiators, but in general, according to the majority of experts, they diminish the role of political parties considerably, and mainly because government campaign funds (with the exception of party convention funds) are issued directly to candidates rather than to parties, and this has decreased their dependence on party organizations. Secondly, by setting strict limits on direct contributions to the campaign funds of parties and candidates, the new law stimulated the development of alternative fund-raising methods--the solicitation of small contributions, mainly through "direct mailings," direct appeals sent to the voters through the mail. This method, which requires sizable financial and organizational resources, turned out to be most aptly performed by firms specializing in consulting services and by the "political action committees" that sprang up and multiplied in this atmosphere.

These committees are created by large corporations and business associations as well as by labor unions and other public organizations. By virtue of the fact that the new legislation restricted their fund-raising activities to a lesser degree than the activities of parties and individual candidates and did not place any limits on their own contributions to candidates, THESE COMMITTEES BECAME A CONVENIENT GO-BETWEEN (ESPECIALLY FOR CORPORATIONS) IN CAMPAIGN FUNDING. It is not surprising that business "political action committees" accounted for the lion's share of the dramatic increase in the number of such organizations and their financial resources in recent years.¹¹ As a result, the "political action committees" have become one of the main sources of campaign financing, taking the place of the political parties in this sphere. For example, their share of congressional campaign costs rose from 13.7 percent in 1972 to 25.3 percent in 1980, while the share of the two parties decreased between 1972 and 1978 from 17 percent to 7 percent for the House of Representatives and from 14 to 6 percent for the Senate.¹²

In turn, the new method of raising additional funds through these committees makes it easier for candidates to use the latest expensive campaign "technology." "It has essentially become possible to 'hire' a surrogate political party," a prominent researcher of U.S. party politics remarks, "but the price is high. The funds of political action committees usually make candidates less dependent on party organizations and their resources, and sometimes even the party label."¹³ It is indicative that these committees have recently stopped confining themselves to fund-raising and have begun to select and prepare their own candidates. Although these retain the label of a particular party, they depend much more on their direct sponsors, who

oversee the activities of particular "political action committees." The extremely conservative Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, for example, is preparing around 60 candidates for the 1982 election; the largest committee at the same end of the spectrum, the National Conservative Political Action Committee, is preparing more than 100 candidates. Both are financed primarily through fund-raising among businessmen, organizations and individuals on the right flank of the national political spectrum.¹⁴

The impressive organized offensive by rightwing and conservative forces is evoking a response in the form of similar "political action committees" on the liberal side, which are also actively penetrating the campaign sphere. The main ones are the National Committee for an Effective Congress, the Progressive Political Action Committee and Independent Action. In terms of their financial capabilities, however, they still lag far behind their rivals: In 1981, for example, the six leading liberal committees together raised less funds than the National Conservative Political Action Committee or the Congressional Club, which is also the headquarters of J. Helms, the leader of the Republican rightwing in the Senate. The proliferation of these organizations, representing something like "mini-parties," is a symptom of the general tendency toward the fragmentation of the political process, which is sometimes called the "Balkanization" of American politics. Reflecting the objective intensification of the sociopolitical heterogeneity of American society and the increased politicization of all spheres of public life, this tendency is causing the leading political parties to lose control over the election process. In turn, the parties' loss of control in campaigns is unavoidably depreciating them in the eyes of elected officials and is thereby widening the gap between these politicians and the party organization.

Equally significant changes have taken place in the procedure for the selection and nomination of candidates in recent years. The beginning of the 1970's was a period of reorganizational measures in both parties, which were attempting to retain their influence at a time of mass opposition movements demanding "participatory democracy" and an "open" political process. For example, participation in the nomination of candidates was broadened somewhat by changing the rules for the selection of party convention delegates (this applies particularly to the Democrats). These rules envisage "open" party meetings (or caucuses), the principle of proportional representation of the main segments of the population in state delegations, the cancellation of the special privileges of previously elected and appointed party officials in the formation of these delegations and the democratization of the convention procedure itself. In the case of the Republicans, many of the basic premises were recommended rather than mandatory.

The new rules, in turn, promoted the spread of primary elections. Whereas as primaries were held in only 16 states and the Federal District of Columbia in 1968, another 20 states were holding them by 1980. The primaries have turned into the chief method of selecting delegates for party conventions: In 1968 they were used for the election of 38 percent of the Democratic delegates and 34 percent of the Republicans, but in the 1980 election the respective figures were 75 percent and 74 percent. As a result, the number of persons participating in the nomination process rose significantly in both parties--from 13 million in 1968 to 32 million in 1980; furthermore, the proportional number of women among Democratic delegates rose from 13 to 49 percent during the same period, the proportion of blacks rose from 7 to 14 percent and the proportion of young people rose from 4 to 11 percent.¹⁵

These changes had quite substantial effects on party activity. Participation by the party elite in the nomination process decreased,¹⁶ as did its influence in this process. The primaries once served only as an indicator of the popularity of various candidates, leaving the final decision at the convention to party leaders, including the state bosses who control the composition and votes of their delegations. Under these conditions, candidates had to form coalitions at conventions, agreeing to certain bargains and compromises and taking on certain obligations. Now, however, the candidate who wins enough votes in the primaries can win the nomination without having the support of the majority of party bosses, as was the case with G. McGovern and J. Carter. The new nomination procedure is much more democratic than the previous orders issued by party bosses from behind the closed doors of "smoke-filled rooms." But this "emancipation" of the candidate from the party leadership ("I do not owe my nomination to anyone," J. Carter declared with some pride in 1976) can subsequently weaken presidential authority, as it is alienated from the party hierarchy in the Congress; the latter, in turn, does not feel obligated in any way to the President.

The declining role of the party elite in the nomination procedure has been accompanied by the growing influence of competing forces--organizations of candidates and activists on the local level (which usually represent the particular segment of the electorate that is wealthier and more concerned with ideology; this substratum plays, according to the data of special studies, the key role in the primaries).¹⁷ The mass media are playing an increasingly important role, taking on the functions of "finding, breaking in, promoting and advertising presidential candidates,"¹⁸ in the description of renowned political scientist J. Barber. The significance of the first primaries in small states with few delegates is exaggerated by the mass media.

Finally, the increased number of primaries and the need for candidates to participate in as many primaries as possible (because in most cases the votes of convention delegates have to be divided in accordance with the votes received by each candidate in the primaries) are lengthening the campaign season and augmenting the role of professional campaign managers. They usually act independently of party organizations.

As a result, party leaders are sometimes unable to promote their own candidate at the convention or even to reject an unacceptable candidate. Their reduced control in this area has made the party structure more accessible to novices like J. Carter or ideologists at both ends of the spectrum like G. McGovern and R. Reagan.

Obviously, these changes have a variety of political implications. The declining authority of the party elite establishes certain procedural prerequisites for the penetration of this sphere by "unorthodox" candidates, whose political outlook and base depend on the overall balance of political power in the country and the struggle within ruling circles. At the beginning of the 1970's all of these reforms facilitated the temporary supremacy of liberal reformist forces in the Democratic Party, but by the end of the decade, when the political initiative had been taken up by the conservatives, they helped to make the position of the latter in the Republican Party much stronger.

Whereas the old nomination procedure guaranteed, if not the quality of candidates, at least their moderation and reliability (from the vantage point of the party elite), the new one does not even guarantee this. This certainly does not mean

that, as J. Kirkpatrick said with alarm, candidates for prominent political positions now depend only on the will of the voters and are even able (!) "to disregard not only the party leadership but also the dominant political class and its standards and preferences."¹⁹ The "dominant political class" in the United States has enough ways of influencing the selection of candidates, even without going through party channels, to prevent this kind of development. There is no question, however, that from the standpoint of its interests the traditional party machinery for the selection of candidates is not working as effectively as before.

Therefore, the two-party system in the United States has encountered serious difficulties in recent years in the attainment of its major objectives: The parties' earlier monopoly in the campaign process was weakened by the appearance of competing forces in the form of political management firms and "political action committees" and the new role of the mass media. Furthermore, the party elite's control over the selection and nomination procedures has been weakened from within. The overall effects of these changes has disrupted the interaction by various links--the White House, Congress and the party machine--necessary for a coordinated and purposeful government policy. The election process is becoming increasingly fragmented and uncontrollable.

All of this, in combination with other symptoms of the crisis of the two-party system (the contraction of its base of voter support and its increasing ineffectiveness), has motivated American politicians and specialists to seek ways of strengthening the parties and restoring their role in the political process. A special social science committee for party renewal, headed by prominent political scientist G. Pomper and Congressman J. Anderson, later a presidential candidate, was even formed. The "renewal" campaign was even joined by the political parties themselves. Since there is no cure for the fundamental causes of the decline of the two-party system, which ultimately lie in the progressive inability of American capitalism to find solutions to the nation's increasingly acute domestic and international problems, they concentrated on the more feasible task of strengthening the parties' role in the management of campaigns and elections. Each party is making its own way toward this goal, with a view to its own distinctive features and on the basis of its own experience and advantages. The reactions of the two parties, however, had a common feature--a desire to adapt to the new campaign conditions, to master the latest campaign methods and to develop organizational and financial "muscles."

The pioneers were the Republicans. This was due, on the one hand, to their critical state after Watergate and the economic crisis of 1973-1975 and, on the other, to the "Grand Old Party's" traditional reliance on its organizational and financial advantages in its struggle against the numerically superior Democrats. The substantial reorganization, which was conducted under the supervision of Chairman W. Brock of the Republican National Committee in 1977-1980, essentially consisted in the augmentation of the central party machinery's role in campaigns and elections on all levels and a massive expansion of the party's financial base through the widespread use of the "direct mailing" method. The "integrated approach," as it came to be called by the Republican National Committee, includes the regular study of electoral districts and the voting public with the aid of polls; the computer-aided modeling of voter behavior; the determination of the most vulnerable districts and candidacies of rivals ("targeting"); a diversified system for the recruitment and preparation of Republican candidates on all levels; advertising, informational, financial and other forms of campaign support.

This requires closer interaction by the national committee and the party election committees in both Houses of Congress with state organizations, and an intermediate link was created for this purpose--"regional political directors" responsible for the compilation (in conjunction with the heads of state party committees) of plans for campaign preparations and management in each state. It is on the basis of these plans that the national committee distributes funds and resources among states. Besides this, for the first time in history the national committees of both parties (which had never participated in local elections prior to this time) formed special "local campaign divisions" to assist party organizations on the local level with all of the measures envisaged in the "integrated approach." To complete the process, a single party information system was set up on the basis of the national committee's computer center, to which all state party committees were granted access.²⁰

The results of this reorganization were quite tangible. The "direct mailing" method, which was particularly effective with regard to pro-Republican wealthy and conservative strata,²¹ expanded the party's financial base dramatically and increased the number of its contributors to 1.5 million (according to official Republican data).²² This allowed the Republicans to collect a total of 170 million dollars for the 1980 campaign, in comparison to the Democrats' 35 million (although the correlation was already 40.1 million against 17.6 million in the previous election "cycle" of 1975-1976).²³

It is more difficult to measure the effect of the reorganization on election results. Judging by the results of the congressional elections of 1978 and 1980, the Republicans' purposeful efforts to find the weak spots of rival candidates, with the subsequent concentration of resources in these spots, were productive. This was particularly apparent in the Senate elections, where many of the Democratic "targets" were "unseated." Of the 35 Republican candidates who underwent intense party training, 18 were elected to the House of Representatives and another 11 received at least 45 percent of the votes.²⁴

The Republican hope of strengthening party positions on the local level in 1980 was far from justified, but even here the intense efforts to recruit and train new candidates were productive. Of the 63 women elected for the first time to state legislature, 62 are members of the Republican Party, and this is also true of 7 of the 8 new congressmen under the age of 30. Party discipline grew stronger in the Republican faction in the Congress, which was quite apparent during the first session of the 97th Congress in 1981. On the whole, the reorganization has already produced definite results, and the party national leadership is fully determined to continue this process in the future.

Organizational and financial questions have acquired even more importance for the Republicans in the current campaign because last year's hope of a triumphant development of the 1980 victory was quickly dissipated by the declining popularity of Reagan Administration policy. Public opinion polls indicate the loss of party prestige among voters. Of the three elements of the original Republican recipe for success in 1982--"Reagan, reapportionment and resources"--essentially only the third remains. Judging by the statements and actions of party leaders, it is on these resources that they are relying to at least hold on to the positions won in

past elections.²⁵ The party national committee has chosen 275 candidates, and around 100 have undergone special training in Arlington (Virginia). Party national organs are taking an active part in the congressional campaigns in at least 100 electoral districts (not counting local government elections). The Republicans have chosen 44 Democratic congressmen as the most vulnerable "targets." Huge sums have been allocated for candidate training and support: In all, the national committee and the party election committees in the Congress plan to collect 167 million dollars for the 1982 election (the Democrats plan to raise 29.6 million).²⁶

It is one of the ironies of the Republicans' fate that the party affiliations of the candidates could create difficulties for them now that the popularity of the Reagan Administration is declining. "It would be too much to say that the party is nominating puppets," the NEW YORK TIMES remarked in this connection, "but the great variety of services it offers candidates often causes them to sing in unison and take a single campaign approach."²⁷

A different course of action was originally chosen by the Democrats. At the beginning of the 1970's they felt that they could escape crisis by democratizing the party structure in order to attract new politically active strata--youths, women and racial and ethnic minorities--which, in addition to everything else, should have strengthened and expanded the popular base of the party. This is why the process of Democratic Party "renewal" originally involved a procedural reform. It had conflicting results. On the one hand, the reform made the party more accessible to new forces and more appealing to popular opposition movements and established the prerequisites for intraparty centralization by strengthening the regulating role of national bodies in the nomination process and in some other spheres of intraparty life.²⁸

On the other hand, this reform, as even its initiators now admit,²⁹ intensified the proliferation of primaries, weakened the role of the traditional party elite and compounded centrifugal tendencies in the party, both on the popular level and in its upper echelon.

Under the conditions of continued ideological and organizational confusion, this did not produce any immediate political dividends in the 1980 election.

In search of new recipes, the Democratic leadership looked into the successful Republican experience. Although there are still differences of opinion with regard to the political strategy of the Democratic Party, a rare unanimity reigned in the organizational sphere after the defeat in the 1980 election and after the choice of C. Manatt as the new national committee chairman: In essence, it consisted in a unanimous desire to imitate Republican innovations.

"The performance of campaign services," the new national committee organ, THE DEMOCRATS TODAY, stressed, "predetermined the Republican victory in the elections to the White House, Congress and local government in 1980."³⁰ Services cost money, and the key to success was therefore seen primarily in the reinforcement of the party financial base, which, in C. Manatt's words, "should become the cornerstone, the foundation of all our efforts."³¹ In this first attempt to place the party's recent rivals at its service, the national committee is developing a

massive fund-raising operation by means of the "direct mailing" method with the aid of a consulting firm, Craver Mathews Smith & Co. In this process, it will take advantage of voter dissatisfaction with the policy of the Republican Administration, particularly in the area of social security. Although there is still almost a tenfold discrepancy in fund-raising levels, the Democrats plan to reduce it considerably by increasing the number of active contributors to 500,000 by 1984, and increasing the total contributions collected in this manner to 10-15 million dollars a year.

The Democrats, just as the Republicans, have recently decided to use existing "political action committees" for their own purposes and even to create their own organizations of this type, as, for example, the Fund for a Democratic Majority and the Committee for the Future of America, which are connected with the two main Democratic contenders for the presidency--E. Kennedy and W. Mondale. It is possible that the campaign management firms and the "political action committees" might become a new organizational form in the intraparty and interparty struggle if this trend should continue.

Another area in which the Democrats are actively emulating their rivals is the selection and training of candidates. In summer 1981 the party national committee founded a national academy for the training of democrats, representing a system of short-term training sessions in various parts of the country. Within this system, politicians and specialists conduct seminars on all aspects of the campaign process--from television acting skills to the ability to win the support of "political action committees," including a course in "How to Contend with the 'New Right.'" Following the Republican example, the Democratic National Committee has also created a special division to give candidates financial and technical assistance in local elections.

In 1982 the Democrats hope to raise the level of their preparation and improve their chances for this year's election. However, as the author of this article was told by the executive director of the party national committee, Eugene Eidenberg, the Democrats cannot hope for complete success in competing with the Republicans on the organizational and financial levels until 1984.

The organizational efforts of both parties are based on the idea of turning the party machinery into a kind of "good offices bureau" to assist candidates in the preparation and management of their campaigns, which will make the candidates dependent on party organization and will strengthen ties between elected politicians and the party machine. Some American researchers see this kind of "party-firm" as the prototype of the future: The parties will be transformed from "passive institutions controlled by state party organizations and local interest groups into highly professional organizations with limited participation by the masses, whose main function will consist in providing candidates with campaign management services."³²

However, this kind of "party-firm" will radically reduce the number of its own functions and will essentially demote itself to the position of a political consulting firm. The management of campaigns is only one of the party's functions, and reorganization is far from a panacea even for the restoration of control over candidate selection and nomination, not to mention other procedures connected with

the maintenance of the ruling elite's political control over the voters. In this sphere, neither the "political action committees" nor political consultants can replace the party in its traditional role as a mediator, uniting various socio-political forces in broad voter coalitions and influencing voter behavior. It is no coincidence that a theoretical and practical search for other ways of augmenting the role and authority of parties, especially in the nomination process, has recently been noted in both parties. A joint conference of representatives of both parties and the academic community was even held for the first time in December 1981 to discuss these matters. This reflected growing recognition of the common problems facing the two-party system as a whole. "In party circles," said one conference speaker, Professor J. Langley, "there is a common belief that the pendulum has swung too far (in the direction of a weaker party leadership--V. P.), and this is urging us to seriously consider various ways of correcting the imbalance."³³ The conference recommendations, which outline the "bipartisan consensus" in this sphere (like the largely similar recipes of other forums of this kind), consist in the following basic proposals:

A stronger role for the party elite (both bureaucrats and elected officials) in the work of party conventions and conferences and the reservation of a specific percentage of delegate seats for this elite (from 25 to 40 percent, according to various proposals), simultaneously relieving these delegates of any obligations to support particular candidates. This should restore, at least in limited form, the party elite's role in selecting and "filtering out" candidates and strengthen the "moderating" influence of professionals in convention proceedings and the drafting of platforms and their "restraining" role with regard to the "more dogmatic" delegates representing "private interests."³⁴ New incentives are also being created to involve prominent politicians in decisions on intraparty affairs. All of this, according to the authors of the proposals, should lead to greater stability and continuity in party activity and, in particular, to stronger ties between party links (meaning Congress and the party machine). These proposals are already being implemented: The Democrats assigned 10 percent of all their delegate seats to party bosses in 1980, and in the future the figure will increase by another 14 percent in accordance with the changes made in the rules in March of this year;

The restriction of the further growth of primaries by combining them with party caucuses and conventions; shorter campaigns for primaries and the institution of primaries in several stages in order to reduce the influence of early primaries and the mass media; the reduction of the number of candidates and the augmentation of their dependence on local party organizations;

The avoidance of new risky experiments with the nomination procedure and the electoral system (like the plans to institute a single nationwide primary or to abolish the Electoral College).

Other proposals have also been discussed.

Therefore, the last few years have been marked by substantial and conflicting changes in the campaign activity of the leading political parties. Many of these changes are still only developing and it is too early to make any final judgments on them. It is clear, however, as even the advocates of the restoration of the two-party system admit,³⁵ that even if the innovations of recent years can

strengthen its role in the election process, they cannot eliminate the fundamental causes of the debilitation of this system, which are known to have much longer roots than technical or organizational problems.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more about the critical trends in U.S. political parties, see the article by V. S. Zorin and V. P. Savchenko (No 6, 1979), O. N. Anichkin (No 5, 1979), N. N. Glagolev (No 7, 1980) and V. O. Pechatnov (No 7, 1981)--Editor's note.
2. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 29.
3. A. Ranney and W. Kendall, "Democracy and the American Party System," New York, 1956, p 505.
4. J. Bibby, T. Mann and N. Ornstein, "Vital Statistics on Congress, 1980," Washington, 1980, pp 21-24; "Federal Election Commission. Costs of Campaigning Increase" (press release), 10 August 1981; NATIONAL JOURNAL, 16 January 1982, p 101.
5. The clients of American political consultants include former French President Giscard d'Estaing, FRG Federal Chancellor H. Schmidt and prominent politicians in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Sudan; in Israel, the struggle between M. Begin and S. Peres in the 1981 election was managed by the rival New York firms of D. Garth and D. Sawyer.
6. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 16 January 1982, p 101.
7. For more about these firms, see S. Blumenthal, "The Permanent Campaign. Inside the World of Elite Political Operatives," Boston, 1979; L. Sabato, "The Rise of Political Consultants. New Ways of Winning Elections," New York, 1981.
8. S. Blumenthal, Op. cit., pp 57, 141.
9. D. Chagall, "The New King-Makers," New York, 1981.
10. N. S. Seregin, "The Election Act: Pros and Cons," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1976.
11. Whereas the total number of such committees rose from 608 in 1974 to 2,678 in 1981 and their contributions to congressional campaigns during the same period rose from 12.5 million dollars to 55.3 million, the number of businessmen's "political action committees" rose from 248 to 1,729, and their contributions rose from 4.4 million dollars to 35.3 million (according to the data of the "Common Cause" lobby group and the Federal Election Commission).
12. Calculated according to: "Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws," edited by M. Malbin, Washington, 1980, pp 154-155; "Federal Election Commission. Costs of Campaigning Increase" (press release), 10 August 1981.

13. "Political Action Committees and Campaign Finance: Symposium," ARIZONA LAW REVIEW, No 2, 1980, p 455.
14. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 3 October 1981, p 1756; 20 March 1982, p 500.
15. "The American Elections of 1980," edited by A. Ranney, Washington, 1981, p 369; W. Crotty, "'Improving' Presidential Selection," COMMONSENSE, No 2, 1981, p 10.
16. Whereas, for example, 41 percent of all congressmen, 75 percent of the senators and 82 percent of the Democratic governors attended all Democratic conventions between 1956 and 1968, the respective indicators were 15, 24 and 67 percent in the 1972-1980 period (Ibid.).
17. A. Ranney, "Participation in American Presidential Nominations, 1976," Washington, 1977, pp 24-25; "Political Parties in the Eighties," edited by R. Goldwin, Washington, 1980, pp 62-64.
18. J. Barber, "The Pulse of Politics. Electing Presidents in the Media Age," New York-London, 1980, p 8.
19. J. Kirkpatrick, "Dismantling the Parties. Reflections on Party Reform and Decomposition," Washington, 1978, p 7.
20. J. Bibby, "Party Renewal in National Republican Party," in: "Party Renewal in America. Theory and Practice," edited by G. Pomper, New York, 1980, p 110.
21. Incidentally, the reliance on this fund-raising method has also had a political impact. The campaign organizers who speculated primarily on emotional, hostile feelings on particular issues (the Panama Canal Treaty, equal rights for women, increased social allocations, etc.) have helped to shift the Republican fund-raising base in the direction of the more ideologically active extreme rightwing.
22. "Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws," p 31.
23. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21, February 1982.
24. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 3 October 1981, p 1753.
25. Ibid., 9 January 1982, p 53; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 March 1982.
26. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 9 January 1982, p 53; THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1 February 1982.
27. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 April 1982.
28. C. Cotter and J. Bibby, "Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Spring 1980, p 17.

29. D. Fraser, "Democratizing the Democratic Party," in: "Political Parties in the Eighties," p 125.
30. THE DEMOCRATS TODAY, August-September 1981, p 5.
31. Ibid., June-July 1981, p 1.
32. X. Kayden, "The Nationalizing of the Party System," in: "Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws," p 258.
33. COMMONSENSE, No 2, 1981, p 13.
34. Ibid., p 19; "The Electoral and Democratic Process in the Eighties," President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, Washington, 1980, pp 27-28; CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 2 June 1981, p H2565.
35. COMMONSENSE, No 2, 1981, p 66; NATIONAL JOURNAL, 2 January 1982, p 28.

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GROWING MILITARIZATION OF SPACE PROGRAM DEPLORED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) pp 33-44

[Article by G. S. Khozin: "American Space Programs of the Early 1980's"]

[Text] We are witnessing the first signs of the materialization of K. E. Tsiolkovskiy's prediction that mankind will not remain on earth forever but will gradually settle outer space. Many steps have already been taken along the road to space that was paved by the first Soviet satellite and the flight by Yuriy Gagarin: Scientific ideas about the atmosphere and the physical composition of the surface of the moon and the planets closest to the earth have been verified; automatic stations are paving the way to more distant planets in the solar system; photographs have been taken of the surface of Venus, Jupiter and its satellites, Saturn and its rings and satellites; space exploration is contributing more and more to our daily life--in the improvement of agriculture, the efficient use of natural resources and the development of transportation and communications; the flights of manned orbital stations are contributing to the comprehensive study of the universe, broadening the range of applied projects conducted with the aid of space technology and holding out the prospect of a future "space industry"--the outer space production of semiconductors, medicines and many other products requiring unique conditions of weightlessness. Other states have followed the example of the Soviet Union and the United States and are carrying out their own space programs. The socialist countries have been quite successful in organized cooperation in the exploration and use of space.

The history of American space travel represents more than two decades of scientific investigation and practical experience in the use of manned and unmanned space vehicles for the most diverse purposes. Many experiments have been conducted near the earth, on the moon and close to planets of the solar systems, and complex space vehicles of different types have been developed. The particular types of space technology that are of the highest priority in the United States at a particular time and the prevailing trend--whether toward the use of space for peaceful purposes or toward its militarization--clearly indicate the general purpose of the scientific and technical policy of the nation and, in particular, of the current administration.

There are sufficient grounds to regard the present stage in the development of American space travel as an extremely crucial and serious one. The technological potential created by the beginning of the 1980's was adequate for the resolution

of a broad group of qualitatively new scientific and practical problems in the study of outer space and in the improvement of the economy and service sphere. At the same time, the political decisions of the top government leadership are leading to the broader military use of space and are turning space into a potential arena of combat.

On 8 June 1982 President Reagan announced a new U.S. policy on space research and utilization. For 10 months, the White House document says, representatives of various federal departments and agencies discussed and clarified the goals and objectives of the new U.S. national space program, which should represent two separate "but closely interacting" programs--military and civilian. The use of space for military purposes is unequivocally assigned higher priority. The space transport system with its central element, the shuttle, will be used primarily in the accomplishment of military tasks.

The following were declared to be the main goals of the U.S. space program: stronger U.S. security (this wording conceals the administration's plan for the sharp intensification of activities connected with the military use of space); guaranteed U.S. leadership in space; tangible economic and scientific benefits from the use of outer space; broader participation by the private sector in space research and utilization; international cooperation in space in the U.S. national interest.

The directive lists the main purposes of the military use of space: To enhance the "viability and safety" of space systems; to put "antisatellite" systems in operation as quickly as possible; to enhance the effectiveness of space reconnaissance, early warning and control systems; to transmit data obtained in space to the appropriate military agencies and organizations.

Therefore, space technology potential is still closely associated with Pentagon activities.

Finally, one of the Reagan Administration's important organizational innovations deserves special mention. The directive establishes an interdepartmental coordinating group for "pertinent and timely reports to the President on major issues of space policy so that he can take the appropriate actions." The President's National Security Adviser, W. Clark, was appointed chairman of the group, and its members were Deputy Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci, Chairman J. Vessey of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Secretary of State W. Stoessel, the deputy secretary of commerce, Director W. Casey of the CIA, Director W. Rostow of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and NASA Director J. Beggs. The very composition of this group testifies that the Republican Administration plans to use the space program more than ever before as a means of solving military-political problems and an instrument of aggressive foreign policy. The American leadership's intention to spread the arms race to outer space reaffirms the pertinence of the warning issued by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev last summer: "It is a well-known fact that far from all of the consequences of the great scientific discoveries of the 20th century have benefited humanity. There have also been those that cut short the lives of thousands of people. It is simply necessary to take timely steps to keep space from becoming an arena of confrontation and to prevent the militarization of space."¹

Change in Priorities

Many experts in the United States are now saying that the space program is losing momentum, that the allocations for several of its promising scientific and applied projects have been cut off and that the Reagan Administration is ignoring its medium- and long-term prospects as an important field of technological progress. When W. Olstad, acting deputy director of NASA, addressed the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science and Technology in February 1980, he tried to define the main stages in the development of American space travel. In his words, the space program of the 1960's, whose development was stimulated by the launching of the Soviet satellite, the first in the world, began on an extremely primitive technical level, which allowed only for the transmission of President Eisenhower's Christmas greeting through space (this was the first American communications satellite, the "Atlas-Score," launched on 18 December 1958--G. Kh.). The moon landing of the "Apollo" crew was an event "which proved that there were no insurmountable barriers to technical perfection in the exploration of the vast area beyond the earth's biosphere."² During the 1970's, successes were consolidated and the possibilities for new technological potential were assessed. It was at this time that steps were taken to raise the profitability of investments in these projects and enhance the economic impact of space systems for communications, navigation, meteorology, the study of natural resources, etc. The 1980's were supposed to become a period of special "economic efficiency," at which time a transition was to be made from the completion of space projects "at any price" to their realization within the expenditure limits the government could "afford." Preparations were made for a transition to a new stage in the U.S. space program, during which its central element would be economically profitable projects which would make a substantial and tangible contribution to various branches of the economy. Olstad also mentioned such practical applications of space technology in the 1990's as "electronic mail"--the transmission of information around the world with specially equipped satellites, the organization of "videoconferences"--satellite-transmitted personal contacts between specialists in various fields, the regular operation of exploratory radar satellites, the organization of scientific observatories on the surface of the moon and the continued extensive study of the solar system and the universe.

Statements by NASA administrators indicate that many American specialists are well aware of the medium- and long-range prospects of the U.S. space program, and are making various proposals which will, in their opinion, ensure the dynamic and balanced development of the major areas of this program.

The very fact that the political interests of the current administration often determine space program priorities was the reason why many important fields of space technology had to "go begging" during virtually all of the main stages of its development. At the same time, the militaristic plans of some government officials who have had a chance to determine the future of the U.S. space program are having a particularly negative effect on the progress of American space science.

The goals of the American space program were declared in their most general form in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, under which NASA was also created. When the agency's budget for fiscal year 1982 was being discussed, the

objectives of the space program were clarified as the following: broader knowledge of the earth, its environment, the solar system and the universe; the practical use of space technology on a broader scale; the development, operation and perfection of manned and unmanned space vehicles and the more efficient use of aviation equipment for civilian and military purposes with a simultaneous reduction in its energy consumption and its harmful effects on the environment; the transfer of program achievements to potential clients.³

When budget allocations for NASA for fiscal year 1982 were being distributed, involving a total of around of 6.1 billion dollars (this was the first draft of the budget, which had not yet been revised or cut by the Reagan Administration), the following main areas of space technology development and application were specified: the completion of preparations for the operation of the space shuttle and related cosmic systems; the enhancement of the potential of space systems for the remote-control observation of the earth's surface, the world ocean and the atmosphere, long-distance communications and the production of materials in space; the further study of the solar system and the universe; the improvement of technology to make the United States the leader in space. The most convincing evidence of the Reagan Administration's approach to the chief priorities of the U.S. space program in the next few years was the reduction of the NASA budget. In the 1982 budget, which went into effect on 1 October last year, 604 million dollars had already been "taken away" from NASA.

Top government officials and heads of large corporations view space exploration less as a means of broadening scientific knowledge and improving technology than as an instrument of "leverage" and a means of competition and, recently, also as a new way of escalating the arms race. In other words, the priorities of the U.S. space program were already changing in the beginning of the 1980's: The primary objectives involved the use of space technology for military purposes, as a means of competing with rivals in the capitalist world and as an instrument of "leverage" in relations with newly liberated countries.

We should recall that the "Apollo" project cost the United States 25 billion dollars (in 1970 prices), which is equivalent, at an extremely conservative estimate, to 40 billion dollars in 1980 prices.⁴ After the project moved into its concluding stage in the second half of the 1950's, the number of scientists, engineers, technicians and workers participating in NASA projects, which had totaled 450,000, began to decrease and had fallen to less than half the original figure by the beginning of the 1970's. As of September 1981, 138,800 people were working on NASA projects, 116,100 of whom were personnel of contracting firms and 22,700 of whom were the employees of the NASA central staff and research centers.⁵

The American press is now writing with unconcealed regrets about the space projects that fell victim to the economic measures taken by the Reagan Administration and the narrow pragmatic line it is stubbornly imposing on NASA administrators. The cessation of work on the "Solar Belt" project, envisaging the study of solar physics by specialists from the United States and Western Europe, was recently announced. The launching of an automatic orbital laboratory for the study of gamma rays and the placing of a satellite in orbit around Venus, equipped with radar devices to study the surface of the planet, have been postponed. Project "Galilee,"

which called for an automatic station to be placed in orbit around Jupiter to study its atmosphere, is also in danger. "The cancellation of this project and the dismissal of the groups of specialists who work on it will actually mean the end of the study of the solar system," the NEW YORK TIMES commented.⁶ Just prior to this, an AP correspondent reporting on the cuts made by the Reagan Administration in the federal budget for fiscal year 1982 wrote: "If there is any kind of extraterrestrial civilization trying to contact earth, it will have to inform the United States of this before midnight on Wednesday (30 September 1981--G. Kh.). At this time the U.S. Administration will order the disconnection of the equipment used to monitor cosmic radiosignals to detect the presence of thinking beings in the universe." American specialists have had to stop listening for signals for extraterrestrial civilization.

Summing up the administration's position in this area, G. Keyworth, the President's special assistant for science and technology, announced that the government "could no longer afford planetary research projects costing billions of dollars."⁷ All American space research is now tied up in the "shuttle" project,⁸ which is supposed to develop space vehicles of a qualitatively new type, capable of reaching orbits near the earth, performing various operations there, returning to earth and then, after the necessary preparations, making new space flights.

The American press has cited a new total cost for this project--from 15 to 18 billion dollars instead of the previous estimate of 10 billion. The number of planned flights has been reduced: Whereas the prospect of 48 flights before 1986 was being discussed only a year ago, now the goal is only 32 flights, and the further exclusion of another 9 or 10 flights from the schedule is being discussed.

American specialists are also seriously worried about the uncertain economic impact of the space shuttle as a means of delivering payloads to space in comparison with conventional rockets. For example, according to C. Sheldon, an authority from the research service of the Library of Congress, a goal set for the first generation of shuttles--to reduce the cost of putting one kilogram of payload in space from 1,500 dollars (conventional vehicles) to 300, was not attained during the first stage of the project: "The anticipated cost advantage has largely disappeared, but there is still the hope that it will at least not exceed the cost of conventional vehicles." At present, the estimated cost of putting a kilogram of payload in space with the aid of the space shuttle is 1,800 dollars.⁹

Speaking in Detroit on 24 June, NASA Director J. Beggs said that his agency hoped to gain government approval for a long-range project for a permanent orbital station with a crew of up to 12 men, scheduled to begin operating in 1990. However, as the WALL STREET JOURNAL reported, the abovementioned G. Keyworth called this plan "absolutely premature" and expressed indignation at the pressure being exerted on the White House by NASA and the aerospace corporations trying to win support for this long-term trend in the space program.

American scientists are particularly concerned about the reduced volume of space research, especially planetary research programs. Commending the results of the unique experiments conducted with the aid of the Soviet "Venera-13" and "Venera-14" automatic stations, M. Duke, head of the NASA Department on Earth and the Planets, pointed out the systematic and long-range nature of the Soviet planetary research

program and said that American scientists were waiting impatiently for more details about the findings of their Soviet colleagues. The results of the work performed by Soviet astronauts on board the new "Salyut-7" space station, including the international Soviet-French crew working on a broad program of physical, biological and technical experiments, also had great repercussions in the United States.

At a time when the administration is concerned only with the arms race and the interests of monopolies, the exploration and use of space for the good of all mankind have been relegated to a position of secondary importance.

Militarization of Space

One of the more characteristic features of the U.S. space program of the early 1980's is the sharp intensification of its militarization, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Although the total volume of space research and applications (in monetary terms) is growing quite slowly, this activity is losing speed and many promising scientific and applied projects are being cancelled, the percentage of projects connected either directly or indirectly with the use of space for military purposes is rising.

Throughout the history of the U.S. space program, the Department of Defense has been interested in using its results to perfect military-technical potential and to support the activities of armed forces with the aid of satellite reconnaissance and early warning, communications, navigation and geodesic systems. However, the creation of space weapon systems has actually not gone beyond investigative research and development. The Republican administration's efforts to intensify the race for strategic arms and other weapons of mass destruction have extended into space, which the Pentagon, with the approval of some leading politicians, would like to turn into an arena of combat.

The general tone of statements by top-level leaders of the Republican administration and the U.S. Defense Department indicates that they are less and less inclined to pay attention to the system of international agreements limiting the creation and proliferation of various types of weapons. As far as outer space is concerned, plans are being made for the emplacement of new weapon systems there in addition to the devices that will be deployed there to support the activities of armed forces.

Open appeals for a higher percentage of military projects in the U.S. space program, contrary to the letter and spirit of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, became possible only after a definite decision to escalate the arms race was made in the highest echelons of the present administration.

Looking back at the initial stage of the American space program, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW recalled that the first allocations for the development of the "Saint" interceptor satellite were made in 1957, when the Defense Department leadership began to frighten the country with the allegation that the Soviet Union would be able "to seize strategically important areas in space for scientific, military and commercial programs" and would thereby keep the United States out of these areas.¹⁰ In December 1962, however, then Secretary of Defense R. McNamara cancelled the project, calling it unrealistic, even before the first of six series of tests had been conducted.

The sharp intensification of militaristic and chauvinistic feelings among representatives of the present U.S. leadership is obviously facilitating more vigorous efforts to create space weapons, but this time with a view to the latest scientific and technical discoveries. The U.S. Defense Department is no longer satisfied with increased allocations for military research and development and for the purchase of new weapon systems, but is striving to put NASA and other agencies engaged in the development of new technology to work on its own projects. The military establishment is being assisted in the attainment of this goal by the changes that were made in the NASA leadership by the Republican administration. For example, former Secretary of the Air Force H. Mark is now deputy director of NASA, and Major General Avn J. Abramson, who was once in charge of the F-16 project, is now heading the shuttle project.

The American press has printed many appeals for the stepped-up development of laser weapon systems. Representatives of the military establishment and some journalists are openly discussing the laser weapons that are to be installed on satellites and high-altitude planes to destroy enemy targets in space; the so-called "cluster" weapon, which is also designed for the destruction of targets in space and the atmosphere; miniature interceptor satellites equipped with infrared guiding systems. Defense Department experts are once again discussing the expediency of creating "invulnerable" orbital command points, military facilities on the moon and other such projects.

The quicker growth of military activity in space, which is attested to by the dynamics of allocations for Defense Department space projects (financed separately from NASA projects), is also disturbing. Whereas they were equivalent to 50-60 percent of NASA allocations up to the middle of the 1970's, in the late 1970's and early 1980's the Department of Defense had already overtaken NASA in terms of expenditures on space activity. For example, according to the estimates of the Center for Defense Information, in fiscal 1979 the Defense Department spent 5.3 billion dollars on this activity, in 1980 it spent 6.3 billion, and in 1981 it spent almost 7.4 billion.¹¹ The Department of Defense is intensifying this activity in fundamentally new fields, which could make space a combat arena. Many American experts are already pointing out the extremely dangerous implications of the new plans for the militarization of space.

The dangerous fields in which the U.S. military establishment hopes to intensify its activity in outer space are attested to by a statement by Under Secretary of the Air Force E. Aldridge, who listed the "areas of growth" in military activity in space, including the creation of a new, more effective model of the manned shuttle spacecraft, measures for the heightened protection of space vehicles against defects and malfunctions and the deployment of space-based systems for "guaranteed survival" purposes.¹² Since 1979 the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) has been operating a space defense center, located near Cheyenne Mountain. Its main function is the "control of devices for the interception of enemy space vehicles."¹³ The first of these systems, which is already being tested in the United States, is a two-stage rocket, launched from an F-15 fighter plane and equipped with a miniature interceptor with infrared tracking and a conventional military load.

The creation of a U.S. Air Force "Space Command" was just recently announced in the United States. It will begin operating on 1 September 1982 and will be

located in Colorado Springs. Its functions will include the daily operation of military satellites, the monitoring of systems for the interception of enemy space vehicles, the supervision of the use of shuttle spaceships in the interests of the Defense Department and, in the future, the use of laser and other space weapons in combat operations in space. A bill suggesting that the U.S. Air Force be renamed the American Aerospace Force has even been introduced in the Congress. Within a year the "Space Command" is expected to become a unified command and to oversee all military launchings for the Army, Navy and Air Force.

At the end of June the NEW YORK TIMES printed the text of a directive approved by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, which states that "American Armed Forces must make use of available opportunities by exploring space." It orders the continuation of work on space-based weapon systems and preparations for their extensive combat application "if this should be in our (U.S.--G. Kh.) national interest."

It is also interesting that the public has been informed of project "High Frontier," worked out by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative organization close to the administration. It envisages the creation of a global orbital system consisting of 432 "space trucks" with 21,600 miniature interceptors aboard, similar to those tested on board F-16 planes in the United States. According to AIR FORCE magazine, the "space trucks" will be put in orbit at an altitude of 300 knots (540 kilometers) at different angles to the equator, which should ensure the interception of land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles in the middle of their trajectory. The cost of the project, according to the estimates of Defense Department experts, will be at least 350 billion dollars.¹⁴ Striving to justify its aggressive intentions in space by means of the "natural development of modern military technology," the same magazine states that "it would be an illusion to expect the sides involved in a nuclear war to refrain from the use of antisatellite devices equipped with nuclear charges."¹⁵

The obvious shift toward militarization in the U.S. space program is gradually, step by step, depreciating NASA's role in space exploration and diminishing the authority of this organization, which enjoys great prestige in the scientific community. The heads of NASA have not overlooked the unfavorable trends that became apparent in the U.S. space program in the late 1970's. They have put forth serious proposals to heighten the contribution of space research to the development of science, increase the profitability of applied space projects and broaden the group of government and private organizations and individuals in the United States and abroad who will have access, upon the payment of a certain fee, to the achievements of the space program, which will be of interest from the standpoint of improvements in science, technology, the economy and public services.

As early as 1980 the NEW YORK TIMES was already directing attention to the gradual decline of NASA's role and influence as an organization simultaneously in charge of the development and operation of space equipment. After a satellite was put in orbit in September 1980 to monitor the state of the environment, NASA ceased to control the use of satellites for practical purposes. Satellites monitoring processes in the atmosphere and the world ocean and the state of the environment were turned over to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Space communication systems and some other applied systems are being taken over by

large corporations, which envision the prospect of high profits in space technology. In the second half of the 1970's several federal agencies and private corporations made a more vigorous effort to divest NASA of the authority to choose the operational forms and methods of the space equipment it had developed and, in particular, to determine the economic and other terms on which outside clients--government and private organizations in the United States and other countries--would receive access to applied space systems. But depriving NASA of the powers it has held throughout the almost two decades of its existence would, according to specialists, demote it to the status of a research organization, which its predecessor was--the National Advisory Committee on Aviation (NACA).

R. Frosch, who headed NASA until the end of the 1970's, realized that it should not only promote the progress of aviation and space travel, but should also work out theories on the future of all civilization. He argued conclusively that the limited nature of terrestrial resources would compel mankind "to move out into the solar system for energy and raw materials" and that NASA could plan effective ways of carrying out this task.

However, although favorable conditions for the more balanced development of the space program were established during the period of detente and the normalization of Soviet-American relations, the political leaders of the United States, the Pentagon and the large corporations chose to continue militarizing space.

Competition in Space

In the 1960's and 1970's the U.S. position in relation to other capitalist countries and developing states in space research was quite solid. The United States could demand certain political and economic concessions in exchange for access to its space technology (primarily space systems for communications, navigation, meteorology, the study of natural resources and so forth). The situation began to change when West European and Japanese aerospace corporations made a more vigorous effort to gain stronger positions in limited but specific fields in the practical use of space equipment. Now the United States has to "coexist" with several other capitalist countries that are operating their own applied space systems, and in some cases it has had to give way to them.

At the end of 1981 an American magazine regaled its readers with a fairly sad joke making the rounds of prosperous Tokyo corporations: "Now that successful flights of the shuttle spacecraft have been accomplished in the United States, it will not be long before Japan produces its own compact model of the 'Columbia' for export to the United States."¹⁶ This prediction is directly connected with another important aspect of the U.S. space program--the use of its results to attain the expansionist goals of American foreign policy.

It is true that the U.S. position in the struggle for access to sources of crude minerals, for sales markets and for opportunities to exploit human and natural resources in other countries can no longer be called strong. This is why American corporations and State Department heads are keeping an eye on the types of equipment and technology that are of interest to the majority of states and are possessed only by the United States. Equipment and technology of this type are regarded as unique "trump cards" and effective ways of persuading other countries to adhere to a political and economic course benefiting the United States.

The American press has had much to say about the growing interest in the commercial use of space by corporations. Frequent appeals have been addressed to private business, in response to the administration's uncertain position on "civilian space," to take the initiative and work on specific projects promising great economic advantages and practical applications of space technology independently. According to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, the prospect of profits in this area is so good that some private companies are planning to build their own rocket launching systems and expect to compete with NASA in the future. Space is already helping them find oil and gas, catch more fish, compile maps of remote regions, acquire information about the state of forest resources and harvests and work out land use recommendations. The possibility of setting up factories in space is even being considered in some branches.

Long-range plans have been made for the development of space research and applications in Western Europe, Japan and some developing states. All of them testify to the constant improvement of the technical potential of these countries and the reinforcement of their position in several fields of space applications. For example, Western European countries are negotiating a joint project which could lead to the development of an orbital laboratory in the 1990's "capable of operating independently of the shuttle orbital vehicle."¹⁷ Japan has announced its intention to develop its own "mini-shuttle," also in the 1990's. This will be a manned vehicle, weighing under 10 tons, for a crew of four. The Japanese plans are certainly not built on sand: At least 70 corporations in the country are successfully engaged in the development and operation of space equipment. Their annual sales volume almost reached 500 million dollars in 1980-1981. Japan has already launched more than 20 of its own satellites.

In December 1981 the test flights of the European Space Agency's "Arian" booster rocket were completed successfully. Plans for the creation of several types of "Arian" rockets have already been made public. They will be delivered to clients by the recently founded Arianspace Corporation. A correspondent from the American magazine TECHNOLOGY REVIEW writes with alarm that this corporation could put from 60 to 240 space vehicles in orbit between 1986 and 1990 (mainly communication satellites and systems for the study of natural resources) and build up a commercial turnover of up to 1.4 billion dollars (in 1980 prices).¹⁸ In November 1981 the corporation was contracted by two American firms to put two satellites in orbit. The FRENCH PRESS AGENCY called this Western Europe's first serious move into the American space market. In January 1982 an American newspaper published in Florida, where the eastern spaceport is located, reported that even some U.S. corporations would prefer to use the European booster rocket to put their satellites in space. One reason is the lower cost (20 percent lower) in comparison to the "Delta," the American booster of the same category.

According to a McDonnell Douglas administrator, the technical features of the new European rocket are so good that it will be difficult to compete with it. As a result, American firms are losing clients, although they were able to force these clients to accept their own terms just recently. AVIATION WEEK quoted one space program administrator's remark that the Arianspace firm had a more flexible commercial policy than American corporations. "Obviously, we (the United States--G. Kh.) could learn something from the French, who play a leading role in Arianspace, particularly with regard to marketing."¹⁹

The increasing activity of West European and Japanese aerospace firms and the reduced federal support of non-military space projects are diminishing the competitive potential of American firms in this field. At the same time, the number of states using space equipment, including developing countries, is rising. This is giving the United States' competitors more opportunity to strengthen their position. In December 1981 the European Space Agency signed an agreement with the Arab Space Communications Organization, uniting 22 states, on preparations for the launching of the first "Arabsat" satellite at a cost of 23 million dollars. This satellite will provide Arab countries with more than 10,000 radio channels and 2 television channels. India has recently been more active in space applications. Although it still relies on U.S. technical assistance in some areas, it is cooperating more with the Soviet Union, France and other countries in important fields of space research.

The Soviet Union's consistent position with regard to extensive and equitable cooperation with other countries in space research and applications is increasing the number of states wishing to make use in one way or another of the achievements of Soviet astronautics. At the same time, the narrow pragmatic approach of the American administration to the use of space equipment and its discrimination against other countries are undermining faith in the prospect of reliable cooperation with the United States in this area.

The second UN conference on the exploration and use of outer space began meeting in August 1982. The potential possibilities of astronautics are truly colossal. A permanent manned laboratory in space for the manufacture of semiconductors, medicine and other products, an orbiting solar power station and plants on the moon--these and other major projects, affording broad prospects for world astronautics, are being discussed by specialists from many countries.

Mankind wants space to be an arena of peaceful cooperation, free of all types of weapons.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 3 June 1981.
2. "1981 NASA Authorization," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2d Session, vol 5, Wash., 1980, p 2230.
3. "Department of Housing and Urban Development--Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1982," Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, pt 7, Wash., 1981, p 90.
4. INTERAVIA, February 1982, p 175.
5. "1981 NASA Authorization," pp 2401-2402.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 October 1981.

7. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 14 December 1981, p 16.
8. The third launching of the "Columbia" was on 22 March and the fourth was on 27 June. The third flight took 8 days and revealed several technical defects: During the pre-launch preparations, flaws were detected in the ground fueling system, a few dozen insulation panels fell off the tail and nose of the spacecraft when it was launched, instruments for the study of solar ultraviolet rays broke down during the flight and malfunctions were detected in other systems on board. The fourth flight of just over 7 days was made for the purpose of further scientific and technical experiments, including the testing of a remote-control manipulator--a "mechanical hand" designed by Canadian engineers. Malfunctions were also discovered during this flight: One of the engines of the craft's tracking system lost its pressurization and solid-propellant boosters which were supposed to last 20 flights (and cost more than 25 million dollars) sank in the Atlantic after their separation from the craft due to, according to experts, defective parachute systems.

Military experiments for the elaboration of means and methods of space reconnaissance and the inspection of objects in orbit and the organization of communications between control points on the earth and so-called combat orbital stations continued during these latest test flights. A special military payload, "DOD-82-1," consisting of an infrared telescope for the development of equipment for new early warning satellites, an ultraviolet gauge, a space radiation detector and other instruments, was installed on board the "Columbia" during the fourth flight.

9. INTERAVIA, February 1982, p 177.
10. TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, October 1981, p 57.
11. DEFENSE MONITOR, No 9, 1980, pp 1-2.
12. AIR FORCE, January 1982, p 22.
13. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 8 February 1982, p 21.
14. AIR FORCE, February 1982, p 21.
15. Ibid., May 1982, p 29.
16. TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, October 1981, p 48.
17. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 21 December 1981, p 52.
18. AVIATION REVIEW, October 1981, p 6.
19. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 11 January 1982, p 87.

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1983 DEFENSE BUDGET EXAMINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) pp 45-50

[Article by V. A. Mazing and S. K. Oznobishchev: "In Pursuit of Military Superiority (Scanning the Pages of a Pentagon Report)"]

[Text] The report submitted to the Congress by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger on the defense budget for fiscal year 1983, beginning on 1 October of this year, and the military programs for fiscal years 1983-1987 reflected the official Washington view of the present military-political situation in the world and of the role the White House expects the United States to play.

The Pentagon is requesting fiscal 1983 military allocations from the Congress in the amount of 258 billion dollars, which is equivalent to 6.3 percent of the GNP and is 13.2 percent greater than the sum of fiscal 1982 allocations. This is the largest increase since fiscal 1966. The draft defense budget assigns 8.9 percent of the total sum to strategic forces (an increase of 1.7 percent over the fiscal 1981 figure), 41.3 percent to general-purpose forces (an increase of 2.5 percent) and up 7 percent to intelligence and control and communications systems (0.6 percent).

These funds are to be spent on the buildup of military preparations, the production and deployment of new types and systems of weapons, the reinforcement and enlargement of American military bases and support points abroad and preparations for future armed provocations in various parts of the world. Within the next 4 years military spending will increase by around 7.5 percent each year. Sizeable sums (up to 85 percent of the defense budget) will be allocated for the improvement of conventional weapons, which is supposed to meet "the broadest range of objectives." Several initiatives have been worked out for this purpose.

Larger purchases of M-1 tanks have been planned, for example, for ground forces. By the end of fiscal 1987 the number of tanks purchased will be 30 percent greater than the figure planned by the previous administration, and by fiscal 1988 the total number of tanks in the U.S. Army will exceed 15,000.

In the Navy, where the main objective is the "restoration and maintenance of superiority to the USSR on the seas," a new accounting category is being added--"rapid deployment forces"--which will take in only the ships that are fully

equipped for this purpose. The number should rise to 640 by the beginning of the 1990's. The "Tomahawk" cruise missile will be a qualitatively new element of naval armaments, and more than 800 such missiles should be delivered to the Navy by fiscal 1986. Other programs will also be subject to considerable adjustment.

Whereas programs for the development of conventional weapons were once drawn up primarily with a view to the possibility of involvement in an armed conflict in the center of Europe, now more attention is being paid to the "protection of Western interests" in other regions. This is the reason for the constant increase in the number of American servicemen abroad. In 1981, for the first time in many years, their number exceeded half a million (that same year there were 2.082 million people in the U.S. Armed Forces).^{*} The possibility of joint action by the United States and its allies in the event of a conflict outside Europe, according to American military-political leaders, should be "the most effective deterrent."

In connection with this, the estimate of the number of wars in which the United States should be able to participate simultaneously is being raised considerably. The escalation of the arms race is also escalating the Pentagon's militant ambitions. For example, whereas C. Weinberger said in a WALL STREET JOURNAL interview last June that the nation must be prepared to fight two wars, now the number of large and small wars depends on the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign policy. "Outdated strategic concepts," the defense secretary's report says, "are inhibiting the necessary reforms. Consequently, we must give up these old ideas and work out a new policy and new concepts." This "new" element is the capability to conduct combat operations on the particular number of fronts dictated by the "need to protect vital interests and win a victory." To rationalize these expectations of a protracted military conflict, Weinberger says that, given the present balance of forces, the United States "is not strong enough, and the enemy is not weak enough, to hope for a quick victory." This is why, in his opinion, the emphasis in the next few years should be on the overall enhancement of the combat readiness and combat capability of American troops, the augmentation of ground forces and the modernization of weapons, both nuclear and conventional.

There are also new elements in the planning of measures for the further augmentation of mobilization capabilities and the capacity to expand military production considerably. A mobilization preparedness agency has been created by order of the President, and the computer center established on a naval base in Great Lakes (Illinois) is capable of drafting 100,000 people within a month after the declaration of mobilization.

The principal changes in U.S. nuclear development in comparison with the program announced by the previous administration are the following:

The report envisages the deployment of 100 MX missiles, and the first 40 will be placed in existing silos for Minuteman ICBM's. As for the rest, the Pentagon planned to make the final decision on their place and method of deployment in 1983. Soon after the Pentagon chief's report was sent to the Congress, however, President Reagan signed NSC Directive 35 (of 17 May 1982), which stipulated the method of deployment of all 100 MX missiles: They will be concentrated in a "compact group" in hardened underground silos in the state of Nevada, separated from one another by a distance of around 600 meters. The work on the Trident II missile will be stepped

^{*} Around 30.2 percent were members of ethnic minority groups, and 21.9 percent of these were black.

up so that its deployment can begin in 1989. In 1984, according to the report, cruise missiles will start being deployed on bombers and multi-purpose submarines. The beginning of the production of a new strategic B-1B bomber (100 such planes are to be built) and the intention to begin using Stealth bombers in the 1990's were announced. The development of space-based laser weapons and antisatellite systems will be stepped up in 1984. Additional funds will be allocated for an ABM system.

Plans for medium-range nuclear weapons call for the purchase of 207 Pershing II missiles and land-based cruise missiles in fiscal years 1982-1984. Furthermore, the report stresses that after these systems have been deployed in Europe, NATO will have "the necessary potential to deliver strikes against reinforced enemy targets." All of this testifies that the American leadership does not see the solution to problems connected with medium-range weapons in an agreement on their limitation, but in the production and deployment of new nuclear systems.

A decision pertaining to tactical nuclear forces calls for the production of neutron warheads for the Lance missile and neutron .8 artillery shells.

The Pentagon chief's constant references to the need to ensure the invulnerability of new U.S. weapon systems are striking. This desire for invulnerability is connected with the dangerous and groundless concept of the first strike. Weinberger reassesses the arms limitation agreements concluded by the United States in previous years. For example, he calls the results of SALT "disappointing" due to the supposedly onesided (to the detriment of the United States, of course) limitations imposed by the SALT II Treaty. The list of "grievances" against the Soviet Union includes alleged cases of Soviet violations of agreements, although the absurdity of such statements has repeatedly been exposed by authoritative statesmen and experts in the United States itself.

A separate section of the report deals with "arms control." It has essentially been included for propaganda purposes. It repeats all of the bombastic statements about the U.S. desire for a "fair, balanced and verifiable agreement," which would lead to the significant reduction of nuclear weapons. The Pentagon's real views on the problem of arms limitation and reduction are reflected, however, in the description of Ronald Reagan's well-known "zero-option," envisaging unilateral advantages for the United States and its allies, as a "history-making" proposal.

The Pentagon chief's report also discusses the need to reinforce NATO's structure of "defenses." The augmentation of air and ground forces, the escalation of military allocations in line with NATO's long-range program and the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe are called the reinforcement of "forward defenses" but are actually supposed to achieve military superiority for the West. This, according to U.S. military-political leaders, should also promote broader military cooperation among NATO countries.

The United States has already concluded an agreement on reciprocal deliveries of military technology and equipment with 10 West European states. An agreement has also been signed on specialization in the production of several types and systems of medium-range "air-to-air" missiles for NATO, and Great Britain and the FRG will collaborate in the production of short-range missiles of this category. The joint

production of antitank systems, aerial bombs, naval mines and so forth is now being negotiated. The NATO countries are working together on the production of a large variety of armaments--F-16 fighter planes, "Sidewinder" air-to-air missiles, the updated "Harrier" fighter, etc. By involving its allies in "military cooperation," the United States is not only attaching them more closely to its own military plans but is also consolidating its dominant position in the bloc, as it is precisely American weapons that constitute the basis of NATO military equipment. For example, the AWACS program is being carried out by 13 NATO countries, but the role of the West European allies consists basically in serving and supplying American planes equipped with the AWACS systems.

Washington is trying to involve its West European allies in its military-political adventures in various parts of the world. The NATO bloc is now being threatened, the Pentagon report states, not only in the region traditionally covered by the treaty, but also outside this region. This is why the European members of the North Atlantic alliance are "requested" to assume part of the responsibility for developments in the Third World countries and to grant the United States the right to make use of their airports, means of transportation, communication systems and supply lines.* The Pentagon has also asked its allies to take "compensating measures" in case some American troops should be withdrawn from Western Europe to assist "rapid deployment forces" and has advised them to provide American military units stationed in Western Europe with better services. The United States has already been able to talk the FRG, England and the Benelux countries into taking on the functions of supporting and supplying American troops if hostilities should break out in the European theater. Norway's decision to store American weapons and military equipment on its territory is escalating tension in Northern Europe. Washington is still demanding that its allies make a greater effort to expand the NATO infrastructure.

The United States also has no intention of giving up the role of world policeman. The report stresses the "global nature" of American interests and the need to "defend" them in various distant parts of the world. The military programs for fiscal years 1983-1987 envisage a higher "level" of American military presence in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. It declares the need to maintain U.S. armed forces in the proper state of combat readiness for participation in possible conflicts in this region, including a possible regional conflict with the USSR. For this purpose, the program to heighten the mobility and combat readiness of the "rapid deployment forces" is to be completed by fiscal 1987. Plans for fiscal years 1983-1987 include the following:

The creation of a unified command for Southwest Asia. On 1 January 1983 the commanding officer of the "rapid deployment forces" will also become the commander-in-chief of American armed forces in Southwest Asia. The decision to create the new unified command should, according to the Pentagon's plan, attest to the significance Southwest Asia is acquiring in U.S. military programs;

* The West European states are paying a high price for the presence of American troops and expanded military activity within their territory. Suffice it to say that the average selling price of the land turned over for military use in, for example, the FRG exceeds 80 billion dollars (in the United States the figure is much lower--30 billion dollars).

In 1984, munitions and combat equipment will start to be stored on ships located on the seas surrounding Southwest Asia for the three marine brigades that are to be transferred here in the event of a "crisis";

Agreements have been reached with several countries in the region and talks are being conducted with some other states on the use of their airfields and ports and on the expansion of the infrastructure. The total cost of this work has been estimated at almost 1.4 billion dollars during fiscal years 1983-1987 (30 percent more than was planned last year);

The United States intends to modernize and enlarge existing military bases and support points in Ras Banas (Egypt), the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Lajes (Azores), Mombasa (Kenya), Mogadishu and Berbera (Somalia) and in Oman.

The Pentagon chief's report indicates that the United States still views Central America and the Caribbean as its domain. Military intervention in the affairs of this region is blamed on the "Soviet challenge," which consists in the development of economic and political relations with a number of Latin American states. The authors of the report are also troubled by Cuba's increasing authority in the region. "The Caribbean basin," the report says, "should be given more priority and attention than in the past.... We must cooperate more closely with our neighbors." Within the framework of this "cooperation," the United States sends military advisers and mobile training brigades to Latin American countries to teach local soldiers the methods of "counterinsurgency" and supplies these countries with various types of munitions and combat equipment. These measures have a single purpose: to keep the political regimes that Washington likes in power by force of arms and prevent democratic reforms in the Latin American countries.

Questions connected with the creation and improvement of chemical weapons occupy a prominent place in the Pentagon's new military programs. In line with the Reagan Administration's announced program for the chemical rearming of the United States, new lethal binary munitions will be produced. In the next 5 years, Washington intends to spend around 6 billion dollars on preparations for chemical warfare. At the end of last year the foundations were laid for a plant in Pine Bluff (Arkansas), which should already be producing binary weapons by 1984.

The projected buildup of chemical weapon stockpiles is being rationalized by the Pentagon leadership with allegations about data at its disposal on Soviet preparations for chemical warfare. Furthermore, it is being alleged that there is a significant difference (in favor of the USSR) in accumulated quantities of chemical means of warfare. In connection with this, the principal U.S. goal is declared to be the eradication of "inferiority to the USSR" and the creation of "effective deterrent" potential. According to this line of reasoning, until all of this has been accomplished, Washington cannot begin negotiating a total ban on chemical weapons with the Soviet Union. This falsifies the Soviet position at the Soviet-American talks on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, which were held in Geneva in 1976-1980, and all of the blame for their disruption is heaped on the USSR with absolutely no justification, in line with the tradition of transferring blame to the innocent party. In fact, the Soviet-American talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons were cut off by the American side in 1980.

However, at the insistence of the USSR and other socialist countries and with the approval of the non-aligned and neutral states, this matter was included on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Even there, however, the United States is sabotaging its discussion.

The implementation of the chemical rearming plans is another step in the U.S. buildup of the most dangerous and lethal weapons. The use of chemical weapons even on a limited scale would not only kill many people but would also have an irreversible effect on the environment. Ignoring this fact, the United States is taking another extremely dangerous step in the arms race.

The report clearly indicates that U.S. military-political leaders regard fiscal 1983 as a year for the broad-scale deployment of new weapons and the expansion of the military basis for U.S. intervention in the affairs of other states. The long-range "rearming" programs represent an attempt to implement the policy line aimed at military superiority. This line is dangerous and futile but, unfortunately, it is precisely this line that is now governing the official Washington approach to all major problems in international politics.

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SIGNS OF CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

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[Article by Yu. G. Kondrat'yev]

[Text] The United States is in a difficult economic position. Whereas the nation's economy moved rather quickly through the phases of depression and recovery to a period of growth after the crisis of 1974-1975, the new cyclical crisis which began at the very end of 1979 was followed by a brief period of recovery (at the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981) and then flared up once again in the middle of last year and is still going on.

For most of 1981 industrial activity was quite sluggish, and a new slump began in August of that year. Real GNP growth for the year was only 2 percent. Inflation continued to develop and the prices of consumer goods rose 10.4 percent. The rate of unemployment started a new rapid climb. Social and political conflicts were exacerbated.

When Ronald Reagan took office, his administration took several measures within the framework of the widely publicized long-range program for "a new beginning for America," aimed simultaneously at the stimulation of economic growth and the alleviation of inflation.* The government expected the program to have a quick revitalizing effect on the economy through the expansion of investment and consumer demand. But the economic growth anticipated by the administration did not take place in 1981 or in the first half of 1982, although the administration tried to portray any short-lived improvement in conditions as a transition to a new and lengthy period of "prosperity." What is more, in the first half of 1982 the state of the economy grew even worse.

The development and intensification of the critical recession during this period were reflected in the unfavorable dynamics of major economic indicators. According to preliminary estimates, the GNP was 1.482 trillion dollars (in 1972 prices), calculated on an annual basis, which is only 0.1 percent higher than the figure for the crisis year of 1980 and 1.9 percent lower than the figure for 1981. Furthermore, there was a decrease of 3.9 percent in the GNP in the first quarter of 1982 and another decrease of around 1 percent in the second quarter.

* For more detail, see the article by Yu. I. Bobrakov, "Administration Economic Policy and the Presidential Messages of 1982," in No 6 for 1982.

Industrial production declined for almost the entire first half of the year. There was a decrease of 2.1 percent in the total volume in the first quarter and a decrease of around 1.5 percent in the second. From July 1981 through June 1982, there was a drop of 10 percent in industrial production. Furthermore, whereas the output of industrial equipment in general decreased by 7 percent during the first 4 months of this year, the figure for equipment for the construction and extractive industries was 18 percent.

Production cuts led to the mass closure of enterprises and dramatically reduced the overall load of production capacities. According to official American statistics, for example, in May industry was operating at the lowest level of capacity since the crisis of 1974-1975. For the processing industry as a whole, the indicator was only 71.1 percent, with corresponding figures of 43.8 percent in the steel industry, 67 percent in the chemical industry and 65 percent in the cement industry. Oil companies were using only 70 percent of the capacities of their refineries. Labor productivity in the processing industry, according to BUSINESS WEEK, fell 5.8 percent in the first quarter. The automotive and metallurgical industries are still in a state of severe crisis. For example, in the first half of the year the output of steel, according to preliminary estimates, was only 34 million tons, or 14 million tons less than during the same period of 1981. The output of motor vehicles in the first quarter was 28.3 percent lower than the level for the same period of last year, and in the second quarter, according to estimates, it was 23 percent lower than last year's figure.

These critical processes and production cuts dramatically reduced the number of new orders in civilian branches of industry, and in some months there was even a reduction in the absolute number. As a result, for example, orders for new machines and equipment in March of this year were 61 percent lower than in March 1981. At the same time, the expansion of administration military programs has continued to increase orders and production volumes in the military branches of industry.

Crisis processes in the economy stem from the weakness of all elements of total demand, particularly the demand for investments. In the first half of this year, total investments in the economy were 10.9 percent lower (in current prices) than the figure for the first 6 months of last year. The growth of capital investments in machines and equipment and in industrial and residential construction was particularly slow. Investments in productive construction decreased by 1.3 percent in real terms in the first quarter. Capital investments in residential construction decreased by more than 1 percent.

One of the main reasons for the depressed state of investments in fixed capital is that American corporations have encountered significant difficulties in mobilizing financial resources from domestic and foreign sources. In the first place, the contraction of the market and the slower rise of prices reduced the net profits of American non-finance corporations by around 21.1 percent in the first half of 1982 in comparison to the same period of 1981 in current prices. In the second place, the crisis in the securities market increased the percentage of short-term loans in the total indebtedness of trade and industrial corporations--reaching 42 percent in the first half of the year. The ratio of short-term financial assets to short-term obligations continued to decrease at a more or less constant rate. In turn, the growth of short-term indebtedness requires constant refinancing at a time of

high interest rates, which is dramatically increasing interest payments. All of this is also having an adverse effect on the financial status of corporations. In the third place, the high interest rates are limiting the use of the loan capital market even by large corporations, not to mention small businesses and the majority of mid-sized firms.

Here it is important to stress that the Federal Reserve System's restrictive measures to inhibit the growth of the total amount of money in circulation is keeping the commercial bank interest rate high. For most of the first half of the year, the prime rate on short-term credit was 16.5 percent. This is 2.37 percentage points lower than the average annual rate for 1981, but the real rate has actually risen because prices are not rising as quickly.

The high interest rates have motivated American companies to reassess their investment programs. According to American forecasts, real investments in fixed capital will drop 2.4-3.5 percent in 1982 as a whole. This will have an adverse effect on the dynamics of the capital-labor ratio and labor productivity in the U.S. economy. American economists expect the rising cost of credit to virtually neutralize the stimulating effect of the accelerated depreciation deductions instituted by the Reagan Administration as part of its economic program.

Under these conditions, and given the uncertain prospect of future price dynamics and the lower profit margin, industrial corporations with large reserves of under-loaded capacities are revising their investment plans and are thereby inhibiting the process of the mass renewal and expansion of fixed productive capital--the necessary basis for cyclical growth--and are exacerbating recession. The uncertain prospects for economic development have attracted many businessmen and investors into the sphere of speculative operations, such as real estate, futures and currency operations, diverting capital from productive applications.

The instability of economic conditions in general has also been reflected in another element of total demand--consumer spending. In the first half of 1982, calculated on the annual basis, it rose only 2.7 percent in current prices in comparison to the fourth quarter of 1981, but in real terms it stayed on the previous level. The real rate of consumer expenditures on many types of durable goods--motor vehicles and household appliances--was still below the level of 1978-1979. The continued high rate of interest on consumer credit and mortgages (16 percent) reduced the demand for durable goods and housing respectively.

Sluggish consumer demand is having a negative effect on retail trade and is helping to perpetuate the slump in many leading branches of industry, especially the automobile industry and housing construction. In the first half of the year, for example, expenditures on the purchase of housing were lower than in the first half of 1981 both in current (15 percent) and constant prices. The number of housing starts also decreased.

Consumer spending increased mainly in connection with the growth of consumer indebtedness and the use of personal savings, which fell from 6.1 percent of personal income in the fourth quarter of 1981 to 5.3 percent in the second quarter of 1982. Furthermore, this means of expanding consumer purchases cannot lay a solid foundation for production growth.

As for commodity stocks, they decreased substantially (by 40 billion dollars in the first quarter and another 16-17 billion in the second), which contributed to the decrease in the GNP.

Despite the critical state of the economy, the U.S. Government is trying to contain inflation by rejecting the use of expanded government demand as a means of sustaining market activity. It has increased only its purchases of military goods, and mainly at the expense of social and other civilian programs. As a result, total government expenditures on goods and services, calculated on an annual basis and in current prices, remained at around the same level as during the fourth quarter of last year, amounting to around 625 billion dollars.

There was a significant rise in the number of bankruptcies. This phenomenon has acquired huge dimensions in the capitalist countries, affecting even companies which are the leaders in specific branches and in the national economy in general. Predictions that certain major corporations might go bankrupt are seen more frequently in the American press, and these predictions are coming true more frequently. For example, AM International and Saxon Industries, which are among the 500 largest U.S. corporations, and Braniff Air Freight filed for bankruptcy this spring. According to NEWSWEEK magazine, International Harvester--the largest producer of agricultural machines--and Western Airlines are on the verge of bankruptcy. In all, 6,205 firms went bankrupt just in the first 4 months of this year--that is, almost the same number as during the entire year of 1978. According to the predictions of BUSINESS WEEK, 23,000 companies, if not more, might go bankrupt in 1982.

The complexity of economic conditions is clearly reflected in the labor market. Production cuts are accompanied by increasingly massive layoffs. By the beginning of June, the number of unemployed exceeded 10.5 million, or 9.5 percent of the total labor force. This is a postwar record. The percentage of unemployed is particularly high among black youth (49.8 percent), white adolescents who are just entering the labor market and women. There is much more part-time employment, which should be called part-time unemployment. For example, the number of Americans working a part-time day has reached the record level of 5.8 million. According to reports in the American press, in May only 39 percent of all jobless blue- and white-collar workers were still receiving unemployment compensation--this is the lowest level for all postwar crises. Furthermore, the maximum term of compensation has been cut almost in half.

The growth of unemployment has given monopolistic capital favorable opportunities for a continuous assault on the vital rights of the working public. According to American economists, the "sluggish labor market due to the high level of unemployment has slowed down the growth of nominal wages." For example, the collective contracts signed at the beginning of the year envisage a rise of only 2 percent a year on the average in the nominal wage for the 3 years they will be in effect. The position of labor has become even worse as a result of the Reagan Administration's policy of cutting social programs. In 1982 these cuts already amounted to tens of billions of dollars.

At the same time, despite the restrictive measures to cut social expenditures, the administration's goal of gradually reducing the deficit and balancing the federal budget by the end of the present administration's term in the White House

(January 1985) is still unattainable. According to American estimates, the budget deficit will exceed 100 billion dollars in fiscal 1982 (instead of the earlier projection of 43 billion). The administration plans a deficit of 99 billion dollars for fiscal 1983. The reasons for the growth of the deficit include the reduction of federal revenues due to the recession and the tax cuts and, what is most important, the rapid growth of military spending.

The astronomic growth of budget deficits as a result of the administration's entire policy is being opposed by the American public and even by many legislators and other government officials. Even the Senate Budget Committee, where Republicans constitute the majority, unanimously rejected the administration's budget proposal for fiscal 1983 at first. Only the total reluctance of the administration to make compromises and its direct pressure compelled the Senate and House of Representatives to accept this draft as a basis. Even under these conditions, it was passed in the House by only a minimal majority (220 to 207).

Administration economic policy is being criticized by more and more American economists. For example, a report prepared in spring 1982 by experts from the Brookings Institution said that this policy is exacerbating existing difficulties in the economy. If it is not modified, the experts said, high interest rates will "smother" the post-crisis revival of business activity.

In turn, the constant growth of deficits is increasing the public debt. In the middle of 1982, for example, the federal debt exceeded 1.1 trillion dollars. This meant that the President had to request Congress, for the third time in a year and a half, to raise the ceiling to 1.275 trillion (when Ronald Reagan took office, the debt was 930 billion). The interest payments alone, however, are absorbing an increasing percentage of federal government expenditures and putting a further strain on government finances.

For a number of reasons (stronger signs of crisis in the economy, the reduction of public purchasing power, the reduction of corporate investments and the restrictive monetary policy of the government), prices rose more slowly in the first half of 1982. According to preliminary estimates, the rise in prices according to the GNP deflator in the first quarter was 3.6 percent per annum, the rise in wholesale prices was 5.1 percent and the rise in retail prices was 3.2 percent. The instability and unreliability of this trend were reaffirmed at the end of the second quarter, when prices again rose rapidly at the first, extremely weak signs of revived commercial activity. According to American economists, retail prices will rise 6-7 percent over the year. This is a lower rate than in 1981 (10.4 percent) but it is more than twice as high as the average annual growth rate in the 1950's and 1960's. Besides this, these economists feel that the growth rate will continue to rise after the crisis because the causes of inflation, especially the federal budget deficit, have not been eliminated in the U.S. economy. The new round of the arms race, started by the Reagan Administration, could give inflation new momentum.

The recession in the United States and in Western Europe is affecting the development of foreign trade. The deficit in the American balance of trade in the first quarter of 1982 was 5.5 billion dollars, as compared to 4.28 billion in the same period of last year, and Department of Commerce predictions put the total deficit for the current year at 30 billion dollars, or a figure exceeding the 1981 figure

(27.9 billion) by more than 2 billion dollars. Citing the views of economists, the NEW YORK TIMES remarked that the unsatisfactory state of foreign trade would slow down economic development at least until the end of the year. "It is completely obvious," said Morgan Guaranty Trust Vice President M. Hudson, "that the weakness of the American economy is largely due to the inability of American producers to compete within the nation and abroad." It is indicative that the United States is losing its influence in the trade in manufactured goods, including those requiring a high scientific input. The positive balance in the trade in manufactured goods dropped from 25 billion dollars (calculated on the annual basis) in the first quarter of 1981 to less than 5 billion dollars in the same period of 1982.

American goods have recently lost some of their competitive potential in the world market as a result of a fairly significant rise in the exchange rate of the dollar. For example, between 1980 and the middle of April 1982, the real exchange rate of this currency in trade in relation to the currencies of the United States' main trade partners rose by 16.8 percent.

In turn, the relatively high dollar exchange rate is being sustained by the high interest rates in the United States. The difference which became apparent in 1981 between U.S. interest rates and rates in competing countries grew more pronounced in 1982. It is stimulating the flow of short-term capital out of these countries and is thereby exacerbating their currency difficulties. These and other economic matters were hotly debated at conferences of the representatives of Western OECD countries in Basel (April 1982) and Paris (March and May). At that time, the United States' partners expressed strong disapproval of Washington's economic and financial policy, which was aggravating the economic crisis in these countries. American administration spokesmen, however, emphasized their government's firm adherence to a nonintervention policy in currency markets and its reluctance to take action against currency speculation involving the dollar, arguing that this would be contrary to "the free play of market forces" and free enterprise. At the Versailles conference of the heads of state and government of the "big seven" in June 1982, the United States promised, under the pressure of other states, to take a sympathetic approach to the difficulties encountered by West European countries and Japan in the economic sphere and to pursue a more coordinated (with them) fiscal and monetary policy. In fact, however, Washington is doing more of the same. As a result, several West European states have had to adjust their currency exchange rates.

Therefore, the Republican administration's first year and a half in office ended with the birth of several new difficulties in the American economy and more acute conflicts with the United States' partners. The first round of Ronald Reagan's economic measures did not have a positive effect on market conditions. In fact, the reverse is more likely.

In this atmosphere of increasing criticism of his economic policy, the President tried to transfer the blame for the critical state of the economy to the previous administration when he addressed the National Association of Manufacturers in spring. It is completely obvious, however, that today's difficulties were largely engendered by the current administration's measures and all of its conflicting policies--monetary restrictions, cuts in government spending on social programs, a military spending increase unprecedented in peacetime and huge budget deficits.

The administration now has great hopes for the second phase of personal income tax cuts (10 percent), which went into effect on 1 July. This measure is expected to increase public purchasing power and thereby help the economy emerge from the crisis.

Leading American economists believe, however, that recovery cannot be expected before fall 1982 and that it is not likely to last long. The main obstacle, in their opinion, consists in the federal budget deficits, whose growth can force the administration to continue using monetary factors--high interest rates and the slower growth of the monetary aggregate--as a major anti-inflationary remedy, and this could lead to a new decline in commercial activity. According to the latest estimates of American economists, real GNP growth in 1982 will amount to only 0.2-1.0 percent; the level of unemployment will be considerably higher than 9 percent; the prime interest rate will drop slightly (to 15 percent) but the real rate will stay close to the record level.

According to a poll conducted by the WALL STREET JOURNAL, the President's actions are now arousing increasing displeasure even in the business circles which fervently supported his economic program last year. In the last few months, the newspaper stressed, big business has lost much of its confidence in Reagan's policy. According to the heads of the majority of leading corporations, the President is overestimating the possible impact of his program, particularly the tax measures, on economic development.

According to BUSINESS WEEK, the dissatisfaction of the American public with the state of affairs in the economy and the disillusionment with administration economic policy could decide the outcome of the congressional elections this November and the alignment of political forces before the 1984 presidential election.

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CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) pp 56-57

[Report by A. M. on fifth annual conference of International Association of Political Psychology, in Washington, 24-27 June 1982]

[Text] The fifth annual conference of the International Association of Political Psychology was held in Washington on 24-27 June of this year and was attended by a delegation from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences. The delegation was invited to attend the conference by Doctor William Davidson, director of the Center for the Study of the Human Factor in Politics.

The International Association of Political Psychology was founded in 1978. According to the association charter, its main goal is the unification and coordination of studies of the psychological aspects of politics, including international politics. The members of the association include political scientists, social psychologists, psychiatrists, workers in the mass media, politicians, public spokesmen and others.

The work of the fifth annual conference of the association proved that this is a promising field in contemporary political science, warranting the attention of Marxist researchers. The subject of political psychology consists of a number of aspects of the political process which are of scientific and practical interest. In particular, they include the role of sociopsychological stereotypes in international relations, the psychological aspects of international conflicts, the role and functions of the mass media in politics, the psychology of political leadership and authority, the political views and values of various social groups, etc.

Political psychology is becoming one of the most influential fields in Western, especially American, political science. The scientists in this field are now concentrating on problems in contemporary international relations, especially Soviet-American contacts, the regulation of international conflicts, the prevention of nuclear war, etc. Most of the members of the International Association of Political Psychology advocate the normalization of international affairs and the establishment of constructive U.S.-Soviet relations.

Political psychology is acquiring increasing prestige in the scientific community and is arousing the interest of various sociopolitical groups, including

government circles. This is attested to by the fact that the fifth annual conference of the association was attended by representatives of the U.S. Department of State and the International Communication Agency as well as supporters of the antinuclear movement and activists from this movement.

The topics discussed at the fifth annual conference of the association included problems in East-West relations and the prevention of nuclear war; aspects of American domestic policy; theoretical and methodological aspects of political psychology.

Members of the ISKAN [Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies] delegation addressed a special discussion group on the collective monograph prepared by the ISKAN Department of Ideological Problems, "Present-Day Political Awareness in the United States" (chief editors Yu. A. Zamoshkin and E. Ya. Batalov, Moscow, Nauka, 1980), and also attended six other discussion groups on problems in contemporary international relations.

Most of the speeches, reports and comments expressed serious worries about the current deterioration of international affairs, the continuing arms race and the increasing danger of nuclear war. Most of the speakers pointedly criticized the policy of the Reagan Administration and advocated the normalization of Soviet-American relations and the development of constructive contacts in various fields.

Conference participants who took part in the discussion of the collective ISKAN work (more than 100 people) had a positive opinion of the research conducted by the Soviet scholars of American affairs. The American speakers were W. Davidson (Center for the Study of the Human Factor in Politics), R. Lane (Yale University), M. McAbee (Harvard University), R. Tucker (Princeton University), A. George (Stanford University), M. Daitch (Columbia University), J. McGregor Burns (Williams College), R. White (Washington University) and others. The Soviet speakers were ISKAN representatives V. M. Berezhev, Yu. A. Zamoshkin and A. Yu. Mel'vil'.

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WHAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR SHOULD BE; THE VIEWS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL EXPERTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) pp 68-73

[Article by V. L. Chernov]

[Text] Disagreements over questions pertaining to relations with the Soviet Union became particularly intense in U.S. political circles at the beginning of the 1980's. They are reflected in works by prominent American political scientists who specialize in this area of U.S. foreign policy.

A distinctive feature of current U.S. domestic politics is the sharply increased activity of rightwing conservative groups advocating the redirection of relations with the USSR into the channels of aggressive confrontation and a new round of the arms race. For example, several works by reactionary American political scientists published in the last year or two focus on methods of combating socialism with force.

Apologies for the policy of dealing with the USSR from a position of strength can be found, in particular, in articles by "experts on Soviet affairs" and NSC staffer R. Pipes, editor N. Podhoretz of the conservative magazine COMMENTARY, administrator P. Nitze of the so-called "Committee on the Present Danger" (even before he was appointed the head of the U.S. delegation to the talks with the USSR on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe), Johns Hopkins University Professor R. Tucker and other opponents of detente. These articles openly advise the American leadership to restore the principles of the aggressive and expansionist policy that was pursued by U.S. imperialist circles during the cold war years. In essence, they are advising the restoration of the basic principles of the notorious policy of Soviet "containment," which was conducted by the American leaders in the second half of the 1940's and was marked, in particular, by the creation of the aggressive NATO bloc.

The fact that it is precisely "containment" that is being recommended by conservative American political scientists as the best policy in relations with the Soviet Union is eloquently attested to, for example, by R. Tucker's FOREIGN AFFAIRS article, "The Purposes of American Power." The author says quite frankly that a historical parallel for today's international situation can supposedly be found in the period of the late 1940's, and he stresses that "the security problems on today's agenda are essentially the same as those that were on the agenda immediately World War II."¹

If we consider the fact that the leaders of the Truman Administration who were intoxicated by their monopoly on the atomic bomb interpreted "security problems" as the use of atomic blackmail and intense pressure to force the Soviet Union to give in to American claims to world supremacy, we can see that Tucker's "parallel" is a cover for quite specific plans to adopt the main principles of Truman's aggressive policy. In his article, R. Tucker proposes "limited" or "moderate containment."² In "The Future Danger," a COMMENTARY article, N. Podhoretz writes about the need for a U.S. "strategy aimed at the containment...of communism" on the global scale.³ Although there are some differences between these two versions of "containment," they have the common principle of intense pressure on socialism in order to shake and undermine its foundations, as was the case 30 years ago.

The spread of ideas about "containment" in U.S. reactionary circles testifies, however, to an unrealistic approach to foreign policy issues and to the assessment of American imperialism's potential under the conditions of the present global balance of power. As we know, these ideas entered the consciousness of belligerent U.S. leaders under the influence of the military and economic strength the United States acquired as a result of World War II and its profitable involvement in this war. But even when imperialism was much stronger than it is now, the policy of "containment" was eventually rejected by U.S. ruling circles as an unpromising line.

Since that time, major qualitative changes have taken place in the world arena. As a result of objective changes in the world balance of power, the United States lost the "superior strength" it once had long ago. Under present conditions, the bankrupt idea of "containment" does not even have the fragile "grounds" on which it once rested. Nevertheless, it is being resurrected by the particular political groups in the United States who are still hoping to establish American hegemony in the world arena.

Paradoxically, most of the authors listed above do not deny the fact that substantial changes have taken place in the world balance of power, which are certainly not favorable for a revival of "containment" and the policy of dealing from a position of strength. But the theorists of "containment" have always set goals that are inconsistent with the actual abilities of American imperialism and have always had the mistaken belief that the United States is capable of acquiring resources and funds in keeping with the scales of its global ambitions. Today's apologists for "containment" feel that the United States should start building up its strategic power without delay, achieve superiority in case of an arms conflict with the Soviet Union, including a nuclear conflict, strengthen NATO unity and then launch an attack on socialism from a position of superior strength.

In his FOREIGN AFFAIRS article "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's," P. Nitze suggests that the American leaders "reverse the negative trends in the balance of power" between the East and West, which are tending to establish an approximate balance between them. "Until these trends are reversed, the actual balance of power will not be any better than it is today," the author stresses. "The United States and the West must make the best possible use of the time available to them...by making an intense effort to build up their own collective power"⁴ for the purpose of creating a "position of strength" in relation to the USSR.

It must be said that all of the far-fetched ideas and utopian plans connected with the resurrection of the basic principles of the policy of "containment" are not merely the daydreams of a handful of political extremists who are nostalgic about "the good old days." The idea of "containment" is quite popular in U.S. ruling circles. Washington officials refer to it when they want to cite an example of an "effective approach" to relations with the USSR, and government foreign policy strategists armed themselves with this idea when they worked out various methods of combating socialism. According to most American experts--both critics and supporters of Reagan Administration policy--the present U.S. leadership is striving to adhere to the concept of "limited containment" in relations with the USSR, and R. Tucker's article is almost an expression of the official position.⁵

If statements like these, backed up by Washington's actual steps to escalate the arms race and exacerbate international tension, are viewed against the background of the dramatic intensification of American economic and social problems as the result of the course of militarization and the American plans for a "preventive strike" and "limited" nuclear war, it is clear that, in principle, the United States could even resort to something like the strategy of "massive retaliation," which even American authors have called "potentially catastrophic and amoral."⁶

This possibility is the cause of growing concern in broad segments of the American public, which has been reflected in the works of several political scientists with a more sober view of problems in the development of U.S.-Soviet relations. Administration policy and the views of reactionary groups in U.S. political circles have recently been pointedly criticized by S. Hoffman, the head of the Harvard University Center for European Studies, Johns Hopkins University Professor M. Harrison, MIT Professor N. Chomsky, prominent historian and renowned diplomat G. Kennan and other American experts.

In a NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS article entitled "Reagan Abroad," S. Hoffman spoke of the futility of the policy of "containment," stemming from "the wide gap between Reagan dogmas and the real world." Analyzing the position taken by conservative groups in U.S. ruling circles toward the Soviet Union, he states that "Acheson and Dulles took exactly the same position. But this was a utopia, not a policy."⁷ The author correctly notes that the Soviet Union has always demonstrated its ability to withstand U.S. pressure and to neutralize U.S. attempts to take the lead in the arms race. Given the present global balance of power, he says, reliance on the policy of "containment" can only have a negative impact, including one on the United States itself. "He says in the article: "If the opportunity is not taken soon to establish the kind of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that will minimize the risk of war...the danger of a serious crisis between the super-powers and a greater risk between Washington and our chief allies will grow."⁸

The same view is expressed by M. Harrison in a FOREIGN POLICY article entitled "Reagan's World." "Excessive ambition and miscalculations are again playing a part in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy goals," the author writes. "These goals will encounter resistance and will be undermined under international conditions unfavorable for us."⁹

Most of the American political scientists who criticize the administration's approach to relations with the USSR are well aware that the continuation of the reckless policy of dealing from a position of strength will lead to adventurism.

For example, N. Chomsky cogently proves that the policy of dealing from a position of strength is inconsistent with actual American potential in his MONTHLY REVIEW article entitled "The Cold War and the Superpowers." In his words, the creation of a strong social base for this policy would mean that the American "public would have to be driven to such a state of hysteria that it would support the high cost... of a semifascist budget.... Now we can only wonder whether people will be able to withstand the attempts to drive workers and the poor into a chauvinistic frenzy."¹⁰

"Militarist thinking" is already "permeating the atmosphere in Washington and much of the American press," G. Kennan remarked in one of its latest NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS articles.¹¹

The development of these frightening trends, according to these authors, could have a catastrophic effect on all mankind, including the United States. The critics of Reagan Administration policy are warning that the progression toward war must be stopped and that American-Soviet relations must be returned to the level of secure and stable development.

What specific alternatives to administration policy do the bourgeois political experts who are worried about the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations suggest? Above all, judging from the works by the most typical representatives of this group of American experts, they feel that the burden of confrontation with socialism should be alleviated, that mutual understanding and trust between the United States and the USSR should be strengthened and that the time has come to regain the benefits of mutually advantageous cooperation with the Soviet Union in various fields, especially in the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of the arms race. The increasing activity of reactionary groups, however, has also affected the views of an influential segment of the opposition to Reagan Administration policy, the segment uniting moderate liberals. Most of them see an alternative to the Reagan Administration's approach to the USSR not in a return to the policy of detente, but in a search for the kind of policy that, according to them, will combine elements of cooperation with elements of forceful confrontation. It is indicative that representatives of these moderate liberal groups prefer to depict even these ideas as updated versions of "containment."

The articles by J. Gaddis, a history professor from Ohio State University, "Containment: Its Past and Future" in INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, and R. Legvold, director of the Council on Foreign Relations' program for the study of the USSR, "Containment Without Confrontation" in FOREIGN POLICY, are characteristic in this respect. The approach taken by both authors essentially consists in separating areas of common interest from the U.S.-Soviet "sphere of confrontation" (J. Gaddis lists four such areas: the prevention of nuclear war, arms control, the development of economic relations and the energy crisis)¹² and immediately beginning the necessary talks with the Soviet Union for the conclusion of specific agreements. In the sphere of confrontation, to which the authors relegate all other questions of American-Soviet relations, they actually suggest the continuation of pressure on the USSR. "Effective policy toward the Soviet Union," R. Legvold writes, in particular, "should be pursued in two channels: One calling for firmness, military strength...and decisive action; and the other for cooperation, conciliatory moves and a resurgence of interest in the joint resolution of problems."¹³ In this process, the article suggests, shows of American strength and firmness should not affect cooperation

between the two countries, and vice versa. The authors do not suggest that pressure should be relaxed as progress is made in areas of common interest; they advise the maintenance of elements of competition and cooperation in a "state of equilibrium" until the Soviet Union starts to change its "political image" to please the United States.

Of course, this actually denies the possibility of real trust in Soviet-U.S. relations and of far-reaching agreements in areas of common interest. Although the moderate liberals must be given credit for their attempts to depart from the uncompromising position taken by the Reagan Administration, to avert the danger of war and to begin a dialogue with the Soviet Union, it is significant that they cannot establish a long-term constructive basis for the development of Soviet-American relations. It is easy to see that the alternative to Reagan Administration policy proposed by these groups essentially consists in a return to the basic principles of American policy of the late 1970's, when attempts were made to combine elements of detente and cold war in relations with the USSR.

Noting that the U.S. leadership has been unable to maintain a balance between these two groups of elements, as the authors of the new versions of "containment" had hoped, and that U.S. policy has degenerated into confrontation with the USSR, R. Legvold says that this occurred because "American leaders had much to say about the need to combine elements of competition and cooperation in relations with the USSR but then decided to concentrate only on competition."¹⁴

This explanation, however, sounds absolutely unconvincing. The real answer is probably that reactionary forces in the United States are trying to use every opportunity to redirect national foreign policy into cold war channels and that when they are presented with this kind of opportunity, they make energetic use of it, relying on their influence in ruling circles and the mass media, and then monopolize the entire foreign policy mechanism. The underestimation of this factor is a serious defect in the updated versions of "containment," and the main reason for their groundlessness is the unrealistic hope of influencing the Soviet Union with the aid of force. The only promising basis for the development of relations between the two countries (and this has been repeatedly pointed out by the Soviet Union) is the refusal to use force, the commencement of constructive dialogue both in areas of common interest and in spheres of confrontation, and an eventual return to the positive policy of detente.

An analysis of the most significant works by American bourgeois political scientists, published in 1980 and 1981, indicates that most of these authors, including critics of Reagan Administration policy, are still not openly admitting the accuracy of this conclusion, evidently because the current prevalence of conservative views in U.S. ruling circles has to be taken into account. This is probably why disagreements over aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations have essentially been confined to discussions of different versions of the policy of "containment" until recently. The supporters of detente in the United States have been weakened considerably by the efforts of reactionary groups to consolidate their position. Around fall 1981, however, new tendencies appeared on the American domestic political scene and began to gain strength. They seem capable of making significant changes in the struggle over this major issue. Within a short period of time, the antiwar movement, uniting the broadest segments of the American public, has acquired unprecedented dimensions.

Supporters of peace in the United States are resolutely demanding the cessation of the arms race, the reduction of weapon stockpiles and the renunciation of aggressive military theories that increase the threat of dangerous conflicts in U.S.-Soviet relations. A struggle against the material and philosophical bases of the policy of "containment" and dialogue with the USSR from a position of strength is constantly growing in the nation.

In this atmosphere of widespread antiwar feelings, the voices of the American political experts who realize that the resolution of urgent problems will necessitate the radical revision of the current American approach to relations with the Soviet Union and the renunciation of the policy of aggressive confrontation, are growing louder. "Dancing in the Dark," an article in the April issue of the PROGRESSIVE by R. Barnet, senior research associate of the Washington Institute of Policy Studies, is interesting in this connection. "National security policy," the author writes, "must be based on a concept of American-Soviet relations that differs fundamentally from the one proposed by the current administration.... Coexistence with the USSR should be the point of departure in American policy on security. The alternative is war, and war will mean the end of the American experiment, if not the end of civilization.... But there can be no coexistence with the Soviet Union on any basis other than the principle of sovereign equality. The Reagan Administration's announced goal of military superiority...should be discarded."¹⁵ Barnet advises the American leadership to give up the aggressive plan of delivering the first strike in a nuclear war, to support the idea of a freeze on nuclear weapons and to prohibit their employment and testing.

The antiwar movement is also having an increasing effect on the position of influential representatives of the U.S. foreign policy elite, which has been reflected in recent publications. In particular, an article by officials from several previous American administrations, M. Bundy, G. Kennan, R. McNamara and G. Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance" in FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine, had great repercussions in the United States and abroad. The authors advised the U.S. Government and NATO to refuse to use nuclear weapons first and thereby take an important step in overcoming the orthodox strategic aims of cold war, which are poisoning the international atmosphere.¹⁶

The wave of public indignation aroused by the Reagan Administration's militaristic policy is still growing and will have to be taken into account by the present American leadership and by those who are now thinking about future American foreign policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. Tucker, "The Purposes of American Power," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1980/81, p 249.
2. Ibid., p 261.
3. N. Podhoretz, "The Future Danger," COMMENTARY, April 1981, p 39.
4. P. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1980, p 92.

5. This is frankly discussed, for example, by N. Podhoretz in "The Future Danger" (Op. cit., p 46).
6. J. Gaddis and P. Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1980, p 175.
7. S. Hoffman, "Reagan Abroad," NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 4 February 1982, pp 18, 20.
8. Ibid., p 21.
9. M. Harrison, "Reagan's World," FOREIGN POLICY, No 43, Summer 1981, p 3.
10. N. Chomsky, "The Cold War and the Superpowers," MONTHLY REVIEW, November 1981, p 10.
11. G. Kennan, "On Nuclear War," NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 21 January 1982, p 10.
12. J. Gaddis, "Containment: Its Past and Future," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1981, p 101.
13. R. Legvold, "Containment Without Confrontation," FOREIGN POLICY, No 40, Fall 1980, p 93.
14. Ibid., p 95.
15. R. Barnet, "Dancing in the Dark," PROGRESSIVE, April 1982, p 34.
16. Ibid., p 32.

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ARE DEMOCRATS SEEKING A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE?

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9 Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) pp 73-77

[Article by V. L. Valentinov]

[Text] As the bankruptcy and dangers of "Reaganism" became increasingly apparent and as the first serious test of its political strength--this year's congressional and local elections--drew near, the American public began to take more interest in the Democratic opposition party;¹ certain circles hope that it can rectify the situation in domestic and foreign policy. One example of this interest was a long NEW YORKER article by Elizabeth Drew, a famous American correspondent who is welcome in many Washington halls of power. On the basis of a series of interviews with a number of prominent Democratic politicians, she relates the state of the party, its problems and its prospects.²

The main difficulties the Democrats have encountered in their attempts to work out a realistic alternative to the Reagan Administration's policy, the author of the article writes, stem from factors of a dual nature. First of all, there is a group of factors connected with the objective complexity of the problems facing the country (primarily economic ones), obstacles of an institutional nature which limit Congress' ability to propose its own alternatives to the White House, and the extreme heterogeneity of the Democratic Party itself, which is also impeding the development of a single policy line ("anyone who talks about 'Democrats' as a single entity is ignoring the problem," said the assistant of one Democratic congressman).

Subjective factors, connected with the Democratic view of the current situation and the Democratic approach to politics, are also playing a significant role. The author correctly notes that the Democrats have fallen victim to a myth propagated by the Republicans and the press, which implies that the election of Ronald Reagan was a triumph for the ideas he represents. However, she continues, "the Republican 'ideas' essentially consisted in repetitions of old complaints about 'big government' and excessive taxes, spending and government regulation. The only 'new idea' was the tax cut." Nevertheless, "after the 1980 election the Democrats sank into a state of emotional deterioration, agreeing with the current view that the election had been concerned with ideology, that their earlier policy had been discredited and that they would have nothing to offer in the future."

This, according to the author, was the main reason for the prolonged passivity and depression in the Democratic camp, which did much to promote Reagan's victories in Congress during his first year in office. "Now," a Democratic congressman said, "Reagan's program is falling apart at the seams, but some of the Democrats who knocked themselves out to resist it last year learned their lesson too well." "Many Democrats are still afraid of Reagan," E. Drew concludes. "They follow the results of public opinion polls by day and by night and they know that the President's program is unpopular and has been called unfair by the people, but they are afraid of the public outcry that might be heard if they vote for cuts in military spending or for higher taxes."

The present state of the party is eloquently described by the correspondent as "a mixture of self-castigation, self-flagellation and cautious conformity along with serious thought and political maneuvering."

Of course, the main reasons for the Democrats' indecisiveness lie much deeper than the "emotional deterioration" of which Elizabeth Drew writes. Their "fear of Reagan" did not emerge from a vacuum but was the result of the ideological and political crisis of the party and the loss of direction that made the Democrats so vulnerable to pressure from the right. Many of them saw the rightwing conservative alternative as something just short of the banner of the future and were so intrigued by this latest political "fashion," hypnotizing themselves with the mythical powers of "Reaganism," that they overlooked the growth of another, truly popular wave of opposition to administration policy. The Democrats have only recently begun to adapt to all of these changes.

There is also another reason for the passivity of the Democrats, which is only mentioned in passing by the Washington correspondent. The "political maneuvering" she mentions is nothing other than the campaign intrigues that have always been part of American party politics.

For example, many legislators from the Democratic Party prefer, according to E. Drew's article, to "play the waiting game" until the Republicans "dig a hole for themselves." According to one Democratic congressman, "Reagan's program has failed, and the Democrats therefore have a chance to make points without even trying." They can simply "sit out the siege in the trenches" without "putting themselves in Reagan's line of fire. An election year is coming--let the Republicans take the tumble they deserve." Most of the Democrats who made unsuccessful attempts to add their own corrections to "Reaganomics" are now secretly pleased with their failure because the anticipated verdict will apply only to Republican policy, and not to the two-party system: "Reagan made his biggest political mistake," a Democrat joked, "when he let his program be approved."

Sympathizing with the Democrats, E. Drew refrains from making a principled assessment of their "delaying tactics," but an editorial in the more independent NATION magazine defines the nature of this kind of political maneuvering and its effect on society more precisely: "Let the economy suffer, let unemployment figures rise, let chaos reign in the marketplace and let the injustices of last year's budget grow even more pronounced--all of this, as the Democrats evidently believe, will hurt only the nation and not the Democratic Party!"³

Incidentally, some Democrats, as E. Drew notes in her NEW YORKER article, object to "waiting on the sidelines." Above all, she says, there is the serious worry that matters will eventually lead to the point of real "economic collapse" (in the words of Missouri Congressman R. Gephardt), and even if the Democrats should return to power then, the "prize" will not be worth much. Secondly, there is the possibility that this tactic could convey unfavorable impressions of the Democrats as an inactive, irresponsible and even "unpatriotic" party.

This is how Speaker of the House T. O'Neill, the congressional Democratic leader, described these feelings in the party: "Half of my party says that the Republicans should be allowed to stew in their own juices. Some believe that alternatives must be proposed. And the rest say that we should go to the President and tell him that the nation is in trouble and that we will not waste time bickering over who has driven it to this state but would prefer to go to Camp David and decide how the situation can be rectified."

Many Democrats realize, however, that self-castigation and political maneuvers will not be enough over the long range for a return to power and the consolidation of the party's influence in general. This is giving rise to "agonizing self-analysis" and "serious thought" in search of new solutions to the nation's most urgent problems. Evidence of this can be seen in the recent appearance of numerous Democratic "task forces," research centers, committees and informal associations grouped around individual politicians inside and outside the Congress "in search of new ideas and an advantageous position to put future Democratic administrations in the White House," as the author says. But the kind of ideological baggage the Democrats might carry back into the White House is certainly not a matter of abstract interest, and E. Drew is one of the first to single out the general outlines of the opposition party's projected "agenda" from the present cacophony of ideas by employing the findings of a survey of a large group of prominent Democrats.

The details differ, she reports, and sometimes ideas are put forth without any kind of detail, "but many of the Democrats with whom I spoke agree that this agenda should include guarantees of economic growth and 'equality.' They were trying to find a way of halting the rise of price and wage spirals with the aid of tax incentives and other voluntary methods, establish new forms of relations between labor and management, and so forth. They spoke of the need for federal investments in 'human capital'--allocations for education and the training of skilled labor in specific branches. They spoke of the need to emphasize the 'infrastructure'--the reconstruction of outdated transportation systems, etc.--and of broader scientific research. They spoke of the restoration of the industrial foundation and of ways to stimulate and protect new industries and expand exports. Most of them are interested in Felix Rogatin's idea of creating a new reconstruction financing corporation (like the one of the 'New Deal' era) to finance the reconstruction of all branches and the maintenance of new ones (the only disagreements are over the branches that should be maintained). They have also displayed interest in the ideas of Lester Thurow, the MIT economist, about the revival of the economy through the transfer of assistance from 'declining' to 'rising' branches. They speak of branches requiring a high level of technical equipment as a source of new jobs. Naturally, all of them are in favor of the creation of new jobs, but far from all of them know exactly how this should be done. Some see the solution in 'macroeconomic' improvements, believing that economic growth itself

will create a demand for labor, but some have made even more specific suggestions. All of them agree that new jobs must be created through the encouragement of private capital rather than government initiative. Public works programs are no longer in style. The Democrats realize that they have to prove that their party can make both ends meet in the budget. They know that they have to prove that their party does not stand for 'weakness' in international affairs. The Democrats speak of their support for a strong but more 'economical' defense, but they oppose the present policy of confrontation and are working out arguments in favor of arms control. They agree that government programs must be reassessed, that some should be merged and others should be turned over to the state. They realize that government regulation has gone out of control. They are prepared to consider a 'new federalism,' but not the kind envisaged by Reagan; they see his version as a 'Trojan horse' and simply a method of relieving the federal government of responsibility for some of its important functions."

Although the statements cited by E. Drew are vague, they reflect the chief motives and directions of the opposition party's reassessment of its ideology and policy, and this is corroborated by several other items in the American press. The most noteworthy is probably the special issue of NEW REPUBLIC, which was compiled in the form of a "first draft" of the 1984 Democratic Platform and is entitled "The Post-Reagan Agenda."⁴ This document, which was compiled by researchers and ideologists with Democratic Party affiliations, is distinguished by a general emphasis on the augmentation of government's role in the stimulation and direction of private production investments, the financing of scientific research and the training of skilled manpower. It also indicates serious concern about the domestic political implications of "Reaganomics," which could bring about social upheavals and proposes the more equal distribution of the burden of "reindustrialization" among classes and social groups in American society. Furthermore, purely economic arguments are also cited in favor of this social maneuver: "The problem of capital investments," L. Thurow writes, "cannot be solved by lowering the living standard of the poorest fifth of the population and directing this income into investments. The wages of this group combined with the welfare benefits it receives represent only 3.4 percent of the GNP.... If this problem is to be solved, the rich and the middle- and high-income strata must dig into their pockets."

As for matters concerned with foreign policy, the materials cited here indicate that views are quite contradictory in this field. Some liberal Democrats quickly joined the growing antinuclear movement, taking up some of its slogans, such as the appeals for a nuclear freeze, for no first use of nuclear weapons, etc. According to reports in the press, although Democratic officials favor talks with the Soviet Union and the limitation of armaments, they are now supporting the increase in the military budget. "When it comes to military spending," the previously mentioned NATION article noted with irony, "the Democrats are more inclined to stand at attention and salute than to sit down and discuss substantial cuts in this spending."

The next step in the clarification and development of the Democrats' ideological baggage was taken at the national party convention in Philadelphia at the end of June, which was given extensive coverage in the American press. The Democrats, the NEW YORK TIMES noted, "had something more to say about the nation's problems than the usual complaints about Reagan's 'unfairness,'...thereby refuting the

accusations that all they can do is whine."⁵ Convention resolutions reflected many of the recommendations discussed above. Some other ideas were also put forth, including the proposal of broad-scale public works to reduce the tax benefits of high-income strata.

But the "main theme" of the convention, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, was the issue of the nuclear "freeze." In their final resolution, the Democrats announced their "support for the national movement to limit nuclear armaments and prevent their use--including support for the national campaign for a nuclear freeze, as a clear expression of the American public's determination to halt and reverse the arms race." In this connection, the Democrats advocated "speedy and serious" talks with the USSR on these matters. Although this is still only a declaration, the very fact that these points were included in the policy statement of one of the leading American bourgeois political parties, which had categorically refused to even mention the idea of a nuclear "freeze" in its 1980 platform, testifies to the substantial changes that are taking place in the party and in the nation in general.

An important role in the formulation of party political views has traditionally been played by its leaders, and in this connection E. Drew's impressions of her talks with the main contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination are significant.

Edward Kennedy has concentrated mainly on problems in social and economic policy but he is also an active supporter of arms reduction. Although he has expressed his willingness to cancel some federal programs or to transfer them to the states, he "despises the Democrats who have broken off ties with their party." Kennedy does not believe that the intensification of economic difficulties will guarantee the Democrats a victory. The party's main task, in his words, consists in "convincing Americans of the (Democrats') ability to govern, and to govern effectively."

The same kind of loyalty to the "traditional values" of the party is displayed by Walter Mondale, although his methods are slightly different. Of all the main Democratic contenders, he, in E. Drew's opinion, has the most carefully planned program and the most specific proposals with regard to domestic and foreign policy, but experience has taught him that success with the voters demands a general concept. Mondale chose the issue of government's social role to serve this purpose and has returned to the concept of the "state of universal prosperity."

Senator Gary Hart, a member of the younger generation of Democratic politicians, believes that some elements of the old programs should be retained, but he is putting the main emphasis on new subjects and issues because he believes that the Democrats lost the initiative in the area of economic and military policy by concentrating too much on social issues. Hart has rallied the forces of young promising Democratic congressmen and a number of experts and is vigorously advertising himself as a "candidate with ideas."

In contrast with him, Senator John Glenn avoids stating "untested ideas" and is mainly trying to represent a "reliable man in the center." Drew lists former Chairman R. Strauss of the Democratic National Committee and Senators A. Cranston and D. Bumpers among other potential candidates for the presidency.

According to the American press, the June convention in Philadelphia marked the beginning of a new stage in the Democratic Party's opposition role. There is obviously more optimism and "fighting spirit" in the party leadership. Statements by Democratic leaders and the convention documents published in major American press organs testify that the Democrats are adapting to changes in the public mood and are starting to criticize the Republican Administration and the President himself openly and pointedly. This is corroborated by E. Kennedy's statement that Reagan's tax policy is nothing other than "a welfare program for big corporations," W. Mondale's harsh criticism of Reagan, who "has spent 20 years objecting to all moves made by presidents of both parties in the direction of arms reduction," and the cautious J. Glenn's warning that "we must use force to preserve peace, not threaten it." This new attitude was probably expressed most aptly by G. Hart, who said: "To those who say that the President should be given a chance, I say that the President has already had his chance. And he failed. Now it is our turn."

It is still too early to predict what the Democrats will have to say when it is their "turn" and, most importantly, what kind of action they will subsequently take. However, one thing is already clear: The inter-party struggle in the United States is growing more heated, and its barometer indicates further exacerbation.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more about this organization, see V. O. Pechatnov, "The Democrats in Search of a New Image," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1981.
2. THE NEW YORKER, 22 March 1982, pp 130-145.
3. THE NATION, 13 May 1982, pp 577-578.
4. THE NEW REPUBLIC, 31 March 1982, pp 7-33.
5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 June 1982.

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DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9 Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) pp 85-86

[Review by A. S. Shelenkova of book "Opasnost' yadernoy voyny. Tochka zreniya sovetskikh uchenykh-medikov" [The Danger of Nuclear War. The View of Soviet Medical Experts] by Ye. I. Chazov, L. A. Il'in and A. K. Gus'kova, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Agentstva pechati "Novosti", 1982, 149 pages]

[Text] In April of this year the second international congress of "Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War" was held in the English city of Cambridge and adopted a Message to Chairman L. I. Brezhnev of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. The message, signed on behalf of the congress by its co-chairman, Professor B. Lawn (United States) and Academician Ye. I. Chazov (USSR), spoke of the catastrophic implications of nuclear war.

In his response to the message, L. I. Brezhnev wrote: "I agree with your conclusion that nuclear war would be fatal for any country and any people against whom these weapons would be used.... I believe that the warnings and comments of medical experts and physicians deserve the most serious consideration.... Making people aware of the danger that is threatening mankind and of the implications of this danger is a significant contribution to the struggle to avert this danger and forestall the immense evil that has been accumulated in nuclear arsenals." This is precisely the purpose of the subject of this review, a book that has been issued in a massive edition in the Russian, English, French, German and Spanish languages.

Citing abundant factual material and the findings of a vast amount of research, these scientists discuss the irreversible effects of nuclear war on the entire human race. The very list of a number of seemingly familiar facts is shocking when presented in the strictly objective language of medical experts. For example, the TNT equivalent of the two atom bombs dropped on Japan is almost 2,000 times as great as that of the largest bomb used in World War II (p 66).

The authors recall that when the atom bomb fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, everyone within a radius of 2 kilometers from the epicenter of the blast died immediately, and this was not a big explosion by today's standards. Now the number of victims of even a "limited" nuclear strike would be so great that the human mind cannot fathom it. Virtually every inhabitant of any large city in the world would either be killed instantaneously, directly as a result of the explosion, or would die from burns, radiation and fires within a few hours after the explosion.

The authors are particularly concerned with the biological consequences of "limited" nuclear war. They would not only kill people, but would also engender unpredictable diseases, abnormal changes in body organs and tissues and irreversible mental disorders. The use of high-yield nuclear weapons would destroy the ozone layer, and a devastating blast of harsh solar ultra-violet rays would destroy all life on earth.

The genetic consequences would have a catastrophic effect on future generations, if indeed there should be any future generations. Within the first 8 years after the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, various congenital and developmental defects were discovered in the children of the survivors of the atomic explosion: stunted growth, emaciation, deformed heads and chests, mental retardation, corneal opacity and congenital cataracts. The effects on the first generation were particularly tragic.

In their assessment of the implications of nuclear war, the authors of this book proceed from the assumption that the use of nuclear weapons will inevitably bring about a general holocaust. Hundreds of millions of the world's inhabitants will die in the flames and "the survivors will envy the dead." Medicine will be unable to provide victims with any kind of effective treatment because hundreds of thousands of medical personnel will die.

The Soviet scientists warn that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, and its outcome will be the death of hundreds of millions of people and the fall of civilization.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RESEARCH

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 19 Aug 82) p 92

[Review by A. Ya. Bulovinova of book "Gosudarstvennoye regulirovaniye nauchnykh issledovaniy v SShA" by A. A. Gavrilov and V. S. Denisenko, Moscow, "Nauka", 1981, 302 pages]

[Text] A distinctive feature of this work is that the authors concentrated on non-military research. They cite numerous facts to illustrate the reorganization of White House scientific counseling bodies and the formation of a new scientific staff for the President. They discuss the reorganization of congressional committees and the reinforcement of the congressional scientific counseling system. They examine the organization of research in new agencies in detail--the Environmental Protection Agency (pp 66-70), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, created as part of the Department of Commerce (p 71), and the Department of Energy (pp 71-76).

The book contains a special discussion of the National Science Foundation, which plays a special role among U.S. federal agencies in charge of scientific affairs due to its stimulation of primarily fundamental research projects and its organization of financing for applied research and scientific training programs (p 89).

The authors discuss the new approach to the making and conduct of state policy on scientific matters, connected with the use of forecasts and plans for the scientific activity of federal agencies.

The authors' analysis of the system of government-financed research in the United States and the distribution of federal allocations for research and development is of great interest. Extensive statistical information is used to illustrate the dynamics of nationwide research and development expenditures in the United States at the end of the 1970's (p 223) and the dependence of this indicator on the irregular allocation of funds for these purposes.

In spite of the slight increase in federal interest in non-military research, the authors conclude, military research and development projects still rank highest in terms of federal support (p 227).

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'COMMON SECURITY.' A PROGRAM FOR DISARMAMENT

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[First installment of abridgment of report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Foreword by G. A. Arbatov

The following article is an abridged translation* of the report of the "Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues" (the "Palme Commission"). The commission's history and basic information about its work are discussed in sufficient detail in the foreword by commission Chairman O. Palme, the former prime minister of Sweden and the leader of that country's Social Democratic Labor Party. I would like to add just a few comments to what he has to say.

The commission members were public spokesmen, politicians and statesmen from 17 countries in Europe, America, Asia and Africa. They represented NATO countries, Warsaw Pact countries and neutral and nonaligned countries.**

Differences in political views, ideological convictions and approaches to international problems, including the problems of disarmament and security, did not keep the members from reaching a general agreement on the most important issues and on proposals and recommendations. Of course, several differences of opinion, sometimes quite significant ones, could not be overcome, and many problems were hotly debated by commission members. However, these debates, just as all of the work of the commission, took place in a constructive atmosphere, in a conscientious search for mutually acceptable decisions and proposals. There was an extremely important reason for this: For states with differing social structures, the issues that were discussed--the preservation of peace, international security and disarmament--constitute a sphere in which important common interests exist, in spite of differences in political positions and views. It is this that makes negotiation, agreement and, eventually, the preservation of peace possible. This objective side of the matter was naturally reflected in the work of the commission. We can only agree with O. Palme, who stresses in his introduction, that "the very process of the commission's work was an exercise in peaceful coexistence."

* A complete translation is being prepared for publication by the Progress Publishing House.

** See appendix for list of commission members.

I would like to remind the reader that one of the 12 commission meetings was held in Moscow (in June 1981). On 12 June General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev received O. Palme, explained the Soviet position on the commission's topics of discussion and wished the commission success in its work. During those days, commission members had an opportunity to ask USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev, officials from the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense and prominent Soviet scholars about matters of interest to them.

Returning to the topic of the commission's report, I would like to say that it was prepared for the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, and its conclusions and proposals were sent to all heads of state and government. Besides this, the report is being published in book form in many countries.

The text of the report will make its basic theme clear to the reader. This also applies to the proposals and recommendations. I think it would be best, however, to repeat a few of the particularly pertinent conclusions and assessments here.

The first is the conclusion that there can be no victor in a nuclear war, that it is a matter of the highest responsibility to prevent the very outbreak of war. Another conclusion is that the belief in the possibility of limited nuclear war is a dangerous illusion. Any limited conflict will unavoidably evolve into a general conflict and lead to catastrophic consequences. Another is the firm conviction that the prevention of nuclear conflicts will necessitate the radical quantitative and qualitative limitation of nuclear weapons and their reduction, the cessation of the arms race and the resumption of the interrupted talks on the most pertinent arms limitation issues.

Responding to a letter from commission Chairman O. Palme in connection with the receipt of the proposals and recommendations of the "Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues," L. I. Brezhnev wrote: "I read your letter with interest. The proposals and recommendations will be...given the consideration they warrant.... I would like to express the hope that the work of your commission will serve the cause of peace and security."

The proposals and recommendations submitted to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament evoked a positive response from the majority of session participants. Its report also aroused great public interest and evoked an enthusiastic response in many countries.

In the West, however, not everyone had a positive response to this document and its recommendations and proposals. For example, the U.S. Department of State announced its disagreement with the commission proposals and call them unacceptable. This should come as a surprise to anyone: This attitude is the logical result of the entire stance of the new U.S. Administration, which has chosen the path of arms race escalation rather than the road to disarmament.

The international situation is still complex, tense and dangerous. Under these conditions, it is particularly important to unite the efforts of all states and all public and political forces fighting to keep the peace and curb the arms race.

Differences of opinion cannot be an obstacle in the struggle against the nuclear threat. The work of the "Palme Commission" and its report represent an unpretentious confirmation of this important fact.

I do not even know who first had the idea of creating this commission. But the idea was certainly no coincidence. The mounting threat hanging over the world evoked a response--the mobilization of all of mankind's forces for self-preservation. The roots of the mass antinuclear movement, which is unprecedented in its scales and its nature and which now encompasses dozens of countries, can be seen here. The roots of the initiative of the physicians who created an international movement to tell people the truth about the consequences of nuclear war can be seen here. This also applies to scholars, religious leaders and representatives of the most diverse spheres of public life who are raising their voices against the danger of war. Statesmen, politicians and public spokesmen in the Western countries and developing states with a realistic view of world affairs, including members of the "Palme Commission," are no exception to this rule. Striving to promote the commission's success, they discussed these problems quite thoroughly with representatives from the socialist countries.

Foreword by O. Palme

In December 1981, at the end of the first year of our work, our commission visited Hiroshima. One of the people we met there was a photographer who had been in this city on 6 August 1945. He described the horrors of that day and then said: "It was a real gathering of ghosts, and I could not even force myself to take a picture of this heart-breaking scene. Finally, I gathered up enough strength to click the camera shutter.... After taking a few pictures, I felt that I had done my duty, and I could not stay there any longer. 'Take care of yourselves,' was all I could say to the suffering people, and I left. But I still hear their weak voices begging for water. This was a real hell on earth, a devil's inferno." "Could all of this actually have happened in the real world?"--he suddenly asked, but it was more of a rhetorical question.

The commission began its work in 1980, at a time when the "real world" of nuclear war might have seemed more remote than it does today. At that time, there was virtually no discussion of the possibility of ending the arms race, not to mention the achievement of real disarmament. The process of arms limitation by means of negotiation was on the verge of extinction.

Since that time, the world situation has become even more dangerous, but it also holds out more promise. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have deteriorated sharply in 1981 and 1982. The arms race is accelerating. The development of new types of nuclear weapons could indicate that the nuclear powers are actually considering the possibility of fighting a nuclear war. The threat of war seems closer now than it has for many years. In the Middle East and in many other parts of the Third World, war is not simply a threat but a reality.

Nevertheless, there are new reasons for optimism. The past 2 years have been marked by an unprecedented increase in the popular and political awareness of the dangers of war. Millions of people on all continents, especially young people, have become involved in the struggle for disarmament. Their concerns have spread

through Europe and Asia and have reached North America. New movements have sprung up, such as the organizations of physicians who have described the consequences of nuclear war in clear and cogent terms.

People are questioning the doctrine of "deterrence" and the nuclear "balance of terror." Voices of warning can be heard from various political and military spheres. Governments are drawing up plans for nuclear arms reduction. There has been a vast outpouring of new and revived ideas about ways of ending the arms race: the creation of nuclear-free zones, a freeze on nuclear arms production, the closure of military research centers, the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, the institution of negotiated mutual moratoriums and the reduction of existing nuclear stockpiles by half.

It was in this kind of atmosphere and against the background of these changes that our commission worked on the compilation of its report. In many ways, we were a unique group. The commission does not consist primarily of experts on arms limitation and disarmament. Its members were chosen more for their political experience in various fields. Many hold or have held high-level government positions, and others have a great deal of experience in the diplomatic sphere and in serving their countries at home and abroad. Three of us were members of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, known as the "Brandt Commission." By bringing together people of such varied professional backgrounds, we hoped to bring new ideas and suggestions into the discussion of disarmament.

Commission members represent the East and the West, the North and the South, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance, the neutral states of Europe, Japan and many Third World countries. There are profound differences in their views on international issues and in their political and ideological convictions. Each has his own idea of peace, security and the better future that might await mankind.

Each was fully determined, however, to see to it that the commission reached an agreement on the common program we were trying to compile. Each was willing to make the necessary compromises to achieve this kind of unity.

The commission was also unique in the sense that this was the first time--and under difficult international circumstances--that prominent figures from the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries were able to agree with representatives of neutral countries on a specific analysis of the military situation in various parts of the world and of the danger to peace and security, and agreed on a broad program of action to avert this danger. In this sense, the very process of the commission's work was an exercise in peaceful coexistence. Our discussions, which lasted almost 2 years, and above all, in my opinion, our impressions of our trip to Hiroshima, which disturbed us greatly, convinced us of the need to work together for the sake of common interests.

Our report expresses deep concern at the exacerbation of the international situation and the gradual move toward war that is so apparent to many people today. We are absolutely unanimous in our view that no nuclear war can be won. An all-out nuclear war will mean unparalleled destruction and perhaps the end of the human race. A so-called "limited nuclear war" would almost unavoidably evolve into a total nuclear conflagration. Consequently, any nuclear war doctrine is a

grave threat to the human race. Nuclear "deterrence" is too dangerous a form of protection against the horrors of nuclear war.

This is why it is most important to renounce the doctrine of mutual "deterrence" and find an alternative. What we propose is security for all. There can be no hope of victory in a nuclear war, because both sides will experience suffering and destruction. They can only survive together. They must achieve security by working with, and not against, one another. International security must be based on a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutual destruction.

On the basis of this strategy of common security, we discussed practical proposals with regard to arms limitation and disarmament. The long-term goal in the consolidation of peace must be general and complete disarmament. However, the commission felt that its duty was to consider gradual steps in this direction for the purpose of curbing and reversing the arms race. We do not propose unilateral action by any country because we are fully aware of the need for balanced and negotiated arms reduction.

Our aim was to promote a downward spiral in the arms race. We have prepared a broad program of measures to reduce the nuclear threat, including major reductions of all nuclear strategic systems. We propose the creation of zones free of battlefield nuclear weapons, starting with Central Europe. We also propose the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. The very commencement of talks on such limitations, in our opinion, will reduce tension in Europe.

Many of our proposals pertain to nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. We are also quite concerned, however, with the reduction of conventional weapons. A large-scale conventional war would be extremely destructive in any densely populated region. Besides this, there is an obvious connection between an agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms, which would guarantee an approximate balance in conventional forces in Europe, and the possibility of reducing nuclear weapons. A balance of conventional forces would pave the way to a nuclear-free Europe.

We are certain that the very search for increasingly advanced weapons--conventional, nuclear or "post-nuclear"--perpetuates military competition. For this reason, we propose a program for the qualitative limitation of the arms race by means of a complete and general nuclear test ban treaty, a negotiated ban on chemical weapons, agreements to limit military activity in space, and other measures.

Our program does not cover all of the aspects of arms limitation and disarmament. During the course of our work, we encountered many problems and possibilities which we could not examine thoroughly. We are fully aware of the complexity of the problems that governments are encountering today in the search for peace and security. We concentrated on areas in which we felt capable of making a positive contribution to this common effort. For the same reasons, we did not elaborate on many of the extremely interesting proposals, such as a freeze on weapons or moratoriums, which stimulated the commission's disarmament discussions. Several of these proposals are aimed at the temporary cessation of the arms race. We felt it was our duty to work out a program aimed at direct and substantial arms reduction; in other words, the gradual deescalation of the arms race.

For obvious reasons, the threat of nuclear catastrophe, which could destroy both the warring sides and neutral countries, both the North and the South, was the central topic in the disarmament debates. But the commission was constantly aware that almost all wars since 1945 have been fought in Third World countries without nuclear weapons. According to some estimates, there have been more than 120 such wars in the two decades since the end of World War II. They have brought tremendous suffering. Many of the most devastating famines of these years--such as the ones in Uganda, Bangladesh and Kampuchea--have come after these wars, under the influence of the upheavals and chaos caused by military conflict.

While I was working on the commission, I made several trips to Iran and Iraq as a special representative of the UN secretary general, where I witnessed the terrible consequences of war--the bloodshed, the destruction and the horrifying losses suffered by the two countries intent on independent social and economic development.

Even the strongest countries in the Third World do not feel safe under the conditions of global tension and local conflicts caused by border disputes and other types of enmity. Poverty, deprivation and economic inequality pose a threat to their security. Many countries are relying more on weapons, which are usually imported from the developing countries, as a means of safeguarding their security. But this simply diverts resources from their economic development and reduces their security even more.

Besides this, there are 62 states in the world with a population of less than 1 million, 36 of which have less than 200,000 inhabitants. They are in a particularly vulnerable position and could hardly afford to build up their military strength.

The principle of common security is fully applicable to the Third World countries. Like the countries which live in the presence of nuclear weapons, they cannot stand up to their adversaries. They also must acquire political and economic security through a commitment to survival for all.

We are convinced of the absolute necessity of safeguarding the security needs of the Third World by means of collective responsibility. These needs are closely intertwined with efforts to safeguard peace and improve relations between nuclear powers.

In our report we proposed a stronger role for the United Nations in the defense of security. We offer only the outlines of a program for the expansion of its possibilities with the aim of reinforcement and the prevention of conflicts through new collective security procedures within the UN framework and the improvement of its peacekeeping machinery.

We also emphasize the importance of the regional approach to security. We propose the reinforcement of regional security through the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones and the establishment of regional conferences on security and cooperation, similar to the one convened in Helsinki for Europe. We believe that regional discussions, including talks on the creation of zones free of chemical and battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe, can play an important role in the achievement of common security in all parts of the world.

In the Third World, just as everywhere else, security requires economic progress and freedom from the fear of war. Our report describes the colossal economic burden the arms race imposes on countries, from the United States and the Soviet Union to the poor arms-importing African countries. This burden has been made even heavier by the present economic crisis, which itself threatens the security of all countries. We agree with the "Brandt Commission" that both the North and the South have a mutual interest in the recovery of the world economy. Government expenditures on military needs, just as the equipment, scientists and skilled manpower engaged in the perfection of the gigantic military machine--are one of the few resources available for the satisfaction of social needs and the financing of development. The East and the West, the North and the South--all have an equal, extremely strong interest in reducing the economic costs of military competition.

When our commission began its work, we wanted to have our report ready for the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982. Our recommendations are addressed to the governments and the representatives of all countries taking part in disarmament negotiations.

But we are anticipating a larger audience. The unprecedented popular and political awakening of the last 2 years has engendered a new public, concerned with the problems of peace and security. People no longer see nuclear war as something distant and unreal. They feel the burden of military expenditures as a result of cuts in public health programs, lost jobs and lost hopes for progress. Now they know precisely what will happen to their cities and neighborhoods if a war should start, and what will happen to their relatives and friends, to all those they love. They understand (often more clearly than many professionals and experts) the shaky premises of mutual "deterrence."

This popular awareness has already become a substantial political force, which has already influenced events. It is unlikely that disarmament will ever be accomplished if it will depend only on the initiatives of governments and experts. It will be accomplished in many parts of the world only as an expression of the political will of people. Its main prerequisite is simply constructive interaction between the people and those who are directly responsible for making the most important decisions on arms programs and conducting the complicated negotiations leading to disarmament.

The beginning of the 1980's was marked by an unprecedented international manifestation of concern about nuclear war and security. It is extremely important to maintain the momentum of this period, not to disappoint people's hopes or frustrate their efforts, to transform their wishes for peace into a policy of peace. We hope that our work will make a modest contribution to the accomplishment of this task. We hope that the factual material in our report will increase the knowledge of the general public, that our analyses will stimulate thought and that our practical proposals will win public support. We envision the kind of international order in which there will be no need for nuclear weapons, in which peace and security will be maintained at a much lower level of conventional weapons and in which our common resources will be used to provide people with more freedom and a better life.

I am convinced that this hope is shared by the absolute majority of the inhabitants of our planet, and I have profound faith in their ability to work toward its realization.

I Common Survival

Decisive action must be taken today to stop and reverse the spiral of the arms race and the deterioration of political relations and to reduce the risk of conventional and nuclear war.

Nuclear weapons are monstrous instruments of war. Modern technology has radically transformed the probable nature and the potential consequences of modern warfare. Weapons with intercontinental ranges, capable of reaching their targets within a few minutes and possessing previously unimaginable destructive force, can destroy within seconds what has taken centuries to create.

The technological revolution has also affected non-nuclear, or so-called "conventional," weapons of war. Technology has considerably augmented the lethal and destructive potential of all military operations, great and small, regardless of whether the great powers are involved in them or not.

In all, the countries of the world spend around 650 billion dollars on weapons each year.

The burden which militarization imposes on the Third World is of a qualitatively different order than the one borne by the rich countries. For these countries, just as for the rest of the international community, a return to the ideals of the UN Charter is not a matter of abstract idealism but an urgent practical necessity.

Problems of peace and disarmament are therefore also problems of international order.

Technology has changed the world in which we live, but the realization of its impact on international relations has not kept up with these changes. The boundaries between states are no longer (if indeed they ever were) impenetrable barriers which can be defended by military means. The population of a country cannot hide behind state borders, build up military strength and cut itself off from the rest of the world in order to live in safety. Our interdependence reflects the main technological reality of the present era: Against missiles armed with nuclear warheads, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE DEFENSE--THERE IS NONE TODAY AND THERE WILL MOST PROBABLY BE NONE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

No matter how many weapons a country adds to its arsenal, it cannot directly reduce its vulnerability in this manner. No known technical means can, even potentially, ensure the effective and reliable protection of people against a nuclear attack. For this reason, the main irony that must be faced is that a country will remain vulnerable to nuclear attack no matter what unilateral action it might take in search of security, and it will therefore remain insecure.

Technology also imposes other costs. The advanced technology embodied in modern weapons imposes a heavy domestic burden--not only by absorbing huge sums of money, but also by diverting already limited resources, particularly highly skilled manpower and materials, from the resolution of social problems. Therefore, another irony of the situation is that all our efforts to achieve security through the buildup of military strength only make us more vulnerable to the internal dangers of economic failure and social unrest.

Both of these paradoxes suggest that neither physical nor psychological security can be achieved without the creation of a system of international relations which outlaws war and works toward the elimination of armaments by means of gradual but substantial reductions. This does not mean an international order committed to the status quo. Progress in economic and social development, the alleviation of political injustices and the reinforcement of human rights must continue. But when states resort to arms, the international community must isolate the conflict and resolve it by peaceful means; only in a world like this can people feel a true sense of national security.

Consequently, to approach even the possibility of real security--putting an end to the danger of nuclear war, reducing the number and destructive nature of conventional military conflicts and easing the social and economic burden of armaments--countries must make important changes in their approach to armaments and security issues. Mainly, they must realize that their own security cannot be safeguarded at the expense of the security of others in the nuclear age. Only through cooperative efforts and policies of mutual restraint can the world's people be able to live without the fear of war and devastation and with the hope of a secure and prosperous future for their children and for later generations.

If a nuclear war should start, all countries will be threatened by destruction. A recognition of this common fate means that states must begin to work with one another in the organization of their national security policy.

The prevention of war, particularly nuclear war, is therefore a common responsibility. The security and even the very existence of the nations of the world are closely interrelated. For the East and for the West, the avoidance of nuclear catastrophe will depend on mutual recognition of the need for peaceful relations, mutual restraint and less intense arms competition. But the stabilization and maintenance of relations between the East and West will also require the resolution of regional conflicts in the developing world (or at least the avoidance of their evolution into open conflicts) and, consequently, the reduced probability of the involvement of the great powers in these conflicts on opposite sides. In a deeper sense, international security also depends on the reduction of existing sharp differences in basic living conditions in different parts of the world.

In their quest for security, countries must pursue broader goals than stability, which is the goal of the present system of security, based on armaments. Stability based on armaments cannot be maintained indefinitely. There is always the danger that the fragile stability of an international system based on armaments will suddenly collapse and be followed by nuclear confrontation. A more effective way to ensure security is to create constructive processes that can lead to peace and disarmament. In this context, it is important to ensure the irreversibility of this process by involving all nations in cooperation for the sake of common survival.

The acceptance of common security as the basic principle underlying all efforts to reduce the risk of war, limit arms and progress toward disarmament essentially means that cooperation will take the place of confrontation in the resolution of conflicts of interest. This certainly does not mean that differences between countries will disappear! Given the ideological differences between East and West, no

real convergence can be expected. Similarly, we should not expect problems in North-South relations, rooted in years of oppression and profound differences in the economic conditions of the two hemispheres, to be solved quickly, just as we cannot expect the quick resolution of many regional and intergovernmental conflicts in the world. The present task is simply to keep these conflicts from taking the form of war or preparations for war.

The report goes on to list the principles of common security, which include the following:

All states have a legitimate right to security;

Military force is not a legitimate instrument for the resolution of disputes between states;

Restraint is necessary in the conduct of national policy;

Security cannot be attained through military superiority;

Common security will necessitate quantitative reductions and qualitative limitations of armaments;

"Linkages" between arms negotiations and political events must be avoided.

The conclusion of this chapter of the report says, in part: Security cannot be safeguarded unilaterally in today's world. In the economic, political, cultural and, what is most important, military sense, we live in an increasingly interdependent world. Peace cannot be obtained through military confrontation. It must be approached by means of tireless negotiations, agreements and the normalization of interrelations with the goal of eliminating mutual suspicions and fear. We are all facing the same danger and we must therefore attain our security together.

II The Threat of War

Although the commission does not want to seem excessively alarmed, we are deeply concerned because we believe that there has been a dangerous tendency toward a growing threat of war in the last few years. If this tendency is not stopped, it can lead to military conflicts of unprecedented destructive force.

Part of the problem is the general deterioration of international relations. But there are also other reasons for worry: the intensified competition between the two main military alliances--NATO and the Warsaw Pact--and between several countries in some parts of the Third World, along with the accelerated proliferation of nuclear and modern conventional weapons throughout the world. These trends have stayed far ahead of the limited achievements of arms limitation talks to date. They have considerably complicated some political conflicts and have poisoned the atmosphere for peaceful negotiations. In some cases the arms race is creating increasingly unstable military balances, giving rise to the fear that the probability of war would be far greater in the event of a crisis. For all of these reasons, the threat of war--even a nuclear war--is more ominous today than it has been for many years.

If Arms Negotiations Fail

The report also analyzes this prospect from the vantage point of the results of past negotiations. Although, the report says, there is the view that these negotiations have supposedly produced nothing at all in the past, they have nevertheless had their successes. Although their tangible achievements are modest, they are important both in their own right and in their impact on broader relations. Furthermore, the course of these negotiations must be viewed in historical perspective and as a continuing process. A great deal of preparatory work has been performed during the negotiation process. In some areas, a common understanding has been developed in the approach to this problem, and the principles and procedures of negotiation have been worked out. If the necessary political will were to be displayed, this research activity would permit quicker progress toward arms limitation and disarmament than has ever been possible in the past.

The Possible Consequences of the Failure of Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The most immediate result of the failure of arms talks would be more intense U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition. It would be extremely difficult to compile a detailed and complete list of the effects this would have on the two sides. Even in the absence of negotiated limitations, they would have to act with a view to their budgets and the difficulties connected with the acquisition of the special nuclear materials used in these weapons. Nevertheless, by 1990 both countries could deploy a minimum of 5,000 additional nuclear warheads. If unlimited competition in this sphere continued until the end of the century, the total number of additional warheads would be several times that number.

An increase of this magnitude would mean the unjustifiable squandering of resources that could be used for productive purposes. A comparison of these swollen nuclear force levels with the level that might have been attained if the negotiation process had continued is even more striking. According to estimates made only 3 years ago, the continuation of negotiations after SALT II could have led to reductions of 10-15 or even 20 percent during the 1980's. Therefore, the net difference resulting from the failure of the negotiation process could be around 10,000 nuclear warheads by 1990, or 40 percent of their presently planned level.

The armament programs that could result from the failure of Soviet-American negotiations could also be extremely costly in other ways. Estimates of the increase in the number of warheads do not fully reflect the danger of the continued deployment of new strategic weapon systems by the two sides.

In the first place, some of the new weapons that could be deployed would be more accurate and more powerful than their predecessors, and could therefore be regarded by the other side as a threat to the survival of its own strategic forces. This will undermine the stability of the strategic balance by giving both sides an incentive to deliver a pre-emptive strike in the event of a crisis; in other words, it will increase the danger of nuclear war.

Secondly, the deployment of some weapons, such as cruise missiles and mobile land-based ballistic missiles, would be more difficult to monitor by national technical means. This means that compliance with future agreements on the limitation of such

systems will be difficult to verify, and it would therefore be more difficult to conclude such agreements. The uncertainties accompanying the deployment of these weapon systems could have other negative political implications as well.

Finally, an unrestrained nuclear arms race of these proportions would perceptibly intensify the existing pressure in favor of the abrogation, or at least, the amendment, of the 1972 treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's). Some Western observers have stated that the deployment of missile defense systems might be necessary to protect land-based strategic missiles from attack in order to guarantee the maintenance of retaliatory capability. Others believe that the ABM treaty symbolizes a model of Soviet-U.S. cooperation that has failed, and that it should be abandoned because subsequent events have demonstrated the inadequacy of this policy. If it should become obvious that no further progress is being made in the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, these arguments will be more convincing. Even the United States officially stated in 1972 that there was a connection between strategic offensive arms agreements and the ABM treaty.

The commission rejects these arguments. We adhere firmly to the view that the ABM treaty is not only an important part of the SALT process, but also a prerequisite for substantial reductions and important qualitative limitations of nuclear weapons. Therefore, anything which weakens this treaty should be condemned.

The Consequences of the Failure of Conventional Arms Negotiations

The results of the failure of nuclear arms negotiations could be heightened by a lack of progress in conventional arms negotiations.

Military confrontation in Europe would reach the critical point. Even in the mid-1970's, when political detente in Europe was growing stronger and more stable, both alliances were strengthening their military potential on the continent. This raises a question: How long can stable East-West political relations survive in the face of the suspicions and fears accompanying the reinforcement of military positions?

At best, political leaders might have to emphasize the dangers posed by the other side's progress in the military sphere in order to gain the political support needed for the continuation of military competition. This would inevitably lead to more tense, or at least less friendly, political relations.

If the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact about mutual reductions of troops and weapons should be concluded successfully, they could minimize these dangers. Their failure, if it should come about, would most probably have a serious negative effect on the stability of East-West political relations and increase the danger of military confrontation. The failure of the attempts being made at the follow-up Madrid Conference (on security and cooperation in Europe) to create a new forum for the discussion of measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe and other steps to stabilize the military balance and reduce military forces deployed in Europe could also have the same kind of negative political impact.

It is more difficult to assess the consequences of the failure of arms negotiations in the Third World because these talks have hardly ever touched on proposals that would limit military potential in these regions. It is clear, however, that the escalation of tension that would accompany intensified competition between the nuclear powers would encourage the growth of military expenditures in the Third World as well.

The Illusion of Limited Nuclear War

(In the report this problem is examined from several standpoints. One of them is the technical standpoint--that is, the technical possibility of delivering nuclear strikes that would not cause "excessive" destruction or death and would demolish only the military facilities of the other side)

In recent years, the development of technology has persuaded some people that nuclear wars need not result in global conflagration, that nuclear war could be limited. These suppositions have been given the semblance of some credibility by the continuous improvement in the accuracy of long-range missiles, the development of nuclear weapons with relatively small explosive yields and the acquisition of precise and detailed maps of potential targets with the aid of reconnaissance satellites. It is possible today to fire a missile thousands of kilometers with sufficient confidence that it will land within a few hundred meters of the target. Furthermore, even this high level of accuracy will be surpassed in the near future. Other technological prerequisites for the theoretical capability to fight a limited nuclear war are either already in the arsenals of the great powers or will soon be added to them. The technical side of the matter is not in question.

What does raise many questions is the way in which this equipment and the people who operate it will function in a specific situation. Anyone who knows about the malfunctions that have been a part of all space programs can imagine the problems that could have a serious effect on the course of any exchange of nuclear strikes, even the smallest exchange. Furthermore, the preparations for space exploration take place under almost ideal conditions, in which highly skilled and experienced personnel can concentrate completely on a single rocket. The atmosphere there is relatively calm, and there is time to double- and triple-check all systems. All of this differs considerably from the so-called "fog of war"--the combination of uncertainty, false information, physical pressure and psychological stress that accompanies any combat operation. It would be naive and unrealistic to expect troops to function the same way in an operational situation as they have in maneuvers.

But operational factors are only part of the difficulty of limiting a nuclear war. Any serious consideration of this kind of conflict would necessitate the incredible assumption that administrators functioning under tremendous pressure would display completely rational behavior, that people and equipment in command and control systems would react quickly, that social unity could be maintained in the face of unprecedented destruction and suffering, that the machinery of state could continue functioning effectively and that military discipline would remain strong. This is difficult even to imagine. The dynamism inherent in this kind of situation would almost unavoidably give the conflict increasingly large proportions.

With regard to other aspects of the problem of limiting nuclear war, the report stresses that just one key element has kept this danger at a relatively tolerable level. At present, it would be virtually impossible to convince the leaders of the nuclear powers that their country could become involved in a limited nuclear war, become the target of nuclear-armed missiles and emerge from the conflict with minimal damage. Of course, it could be assumed that nuclear wars would only be fought on foreign territory, but the danger of escalation makes this hope an illusion.

Above all, it is the ABM treaty which prevents the illusion of a limited nuclear war with minimal damage from acquiring more credibility. In the absence of missile defense systems, the group of advocates of the nuclear alternative will most likely remain comparatively small. If each side were to deploy a significant quantity of such defenses, however, there would be the greater probability that an extreme crisis would motivate one side or the other to initiate a nuclear exchange in the expectation that the war would not lead to the use of large numbers of nuclear weapons and that existing ABM systems could prevent unacceptable damage to its own society. For this reason, the ABM treaty is exceptionally important as a means of removing illusions about the possibility of a limited nuclear war.

International disasters, as history has already witnessed too many times, are often the consequence of several isolated decisions. If the persons responsible for these decisions had known the final result, they would indisputably have chosen alternative courses of action. Instead, when faced with the threat of a perceptible loss, they have taken a small step, involving some risk, in the hope of correcting the situation. Later, when the first step has turned out to be futile, the decision-makers had to choose between an even greater loss of prestige and political capital or a second and more risky step. And so forth.

The situation in the Middle East in 1973 is a good example of how a nuclear war could start. As the war between Israel, on one side, and Egypt and Syria, on the other, continued over a period of several weeks, the United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in the war. Finally, there was the danger that the situation would evolve into a nuclear conflict.

Fortunately, the 1973 confrontation was resolved without combat between the great powers. But what if this had not happened? What if the crisis had taken place not during a period of DETENTE, continuous negotiation and dialogue at the highest level, but at a time like the present, when tension and mutual suspicion prevail? What if the chain of events had continued to escalate and the armed forces of the two great powers had begun to fire at one another? How could the conflict have been settled? During each succeeding phase of decisionmaking, the risk of further escalation, including the possible use of nuclear weapons, could seem less dangerous than the known political cost of yielding to the enemy. In this way, step by step, the two sides could have become involved in a process which could lead to the penetration of the barrier against the use of nuclear weapons for the first time in 37 years. After the penetration of this barrier, the world would enter the sphere of the unknown.

III Consequences of Nuclear War

The specific consequences of a nuclear exchange would depend on many factors. Among the most important would be the weather; winter would be a particularly

difficult time of year for the few survivors. But the main factor would be the number of warheads used and the extent of the destruction. A country's ability to localize the effects of a single nuclear explosion would depend greatly on its government's ability to transfer sufficient quantities of manpower, water, food and medical supplies from other regions. If the war were widespread, its effects would be synergistic; that is, the cumulative effect of fires, shock wave damage, radiation disease and secondary consequences, such as the spread of infectious diseases, could far surpass the sum of the individual consequences of nuclear strikes.

At a certain point, the exchange of nuclear strikes could lead to the end of urban civilization. It is difficult to imagine the preservation of social order in the face of the devastation that would accompany a war involving hundreds or even thousands of nuclear explosions. Would people abide by the authority of a government that had led its country to this kind of incredible catastrophe? It must also be borne in mind that the basic services on which modern society depends, such as protection from criminal elements, the financial and banking system, the production and distribution of electric power and the distribution of water and food to urban areas, could come to a halt. Society could degenerate into a number of separate groups, living primarily in rural areas with the least radiation, each of which would survive in the most primitive manner, relying only on its own abilities and resources.

In his book "The Fate of the Earth,"* J. Schell wrote about this well.

If we look further into the future, considering the possible long-term effects of numerous nuclear explosions on the human gene pool and the incidence of cancer, not to mention their probable effect on the ozone layer, which would destroy animal and plant life and then change the climate, human life itself could be in danger. Mankind would then face the ultimate risk--the risk of its own extinction.

The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment has analyzed several hypothetical examples of single nuclear bombs dropped on modern large cities. Let us consider, for example, the effects of a 1-megaton bomb, equivalent to a million tons of conventional explosives (approximately equivalent to the warhead of an American Minuteman II or Soviet SS-11 missile), on the cities of Detroit and Leningrad, each with a population of around 4 million.

If this kind of bomb should explode in the air over Detroit at night and without warning, around 470,000 people would be killed and another 630,000 would be injured. If the same weapon were to be exploded during the daytime, when the central part of the city is crowded with commuters, another 130,000 people would die. The explosion of a 1-megaton bomb over Leningrad would be even more devastating because more of its inhabitants are concentrated in the city center. Under the same nighttime attack conditions as in the Detroit example, 890,000 inhabitants of Leningrad would be killed and another 1.2 million would be injured. In other words, more than half of the city's inhabitants would be the victims of one nuclear explosion.

* For a digest of this book, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1982--Editor's note.

Large warheads of this type, however, are now being removed from arsenals. The nuclear powers are replacing weapons with yields in the megaton range with larger quantities of weapons of smaller size and with smaller explosive yields. These weapons are even more efficient. Several kiloton-range weapons can do greater damage than a single megaton weapon with a greater total yield. For example, the detonation of ten 40-kiloton bombs over Leningrad, representing only 40 percent of the explosive yield of a single 1-megaton weapon, would probably kill another 130,000 people.

The physical devastation in both cities would be incredible. The buildings in an area of more than 300 square kilometers would be demolished or be made uninhabitable. If the bomb were exploded on the surface, an area extending far beyond the municipal boundaries of the two cities (more than 1,000 square kilometers) would be contaminated by radiation. Rescue teams and medical personnel who would enter this zone to help the wounded would be risking their own lives. Aside from the danger of radiation, rescue operations would be made exceedingly difficult by raging fires, broken water mains, felled power lines, collapsed bridges and destroyed highways and railroads. Beautiful cities would be reduced to ruins.

The effect of a nuclear explosion on medical services would be particularly devastating. The commission met separately with Drs Howard Hiatt and Yevgeniy Chazov, the American and Soviet representatives of the international movement of physicians concerned about the danger of nuclear war. Their testimony left no doubt that it would be impossible to provide the victims of a nuclear attack with timely medical assistance or even the most elementary medical care.

According to official American estimates, American losses in the event of a large-scale nuclear attack will range from 105 million to 165 million fatalities. Comparable estimates for the Soviet Union range from 50 to 100 million. In both cases, it can be assumed that virtually the entire economic infrastructure will be destroyed. In this light, the optimists who predict a possible return to normal life within a single generation seem naive. The conclusion of the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, that a nuclear attack involving thousands of warheads would raise doubts about the ability of the United States (or the Soviet Union) to ever recover its position as an organized, workable and powerful state, is more realistic.

A conference of prominent physicians from the East and West expressed an equally pessimistic opinion. They concluded that an all-out nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR would immediately kill around 200 million men, women and children. Another 60 million would be injured, of whom 30 million would suffer from radiation sickness, 20 million would suffer burns and trauma and the remaining 10 million would be the victims of all three of these devastating factors.

No earlier war can help us understand the impact of nuclear war. In World War II, despite the astronomical losses and horrifying brutality, there was no massive breakdown of society or morale. Air raids on cities and industrial facilities rarely caused any kind of destruction that could not be corrected within a short time. Of course, many people suffered, but many others continued living in the same way. An all-out nuclear war would create a degree of chaos and confusion

for which mankind is totally unprepared, and for which it can never be prepared. It would mean the end of life itself.

Nuclear War in Europe

A group of experts working under the supervision of the UN Secretary General worked out a scenario for analytical purposes in which the two military blocs in Europe used a total of 1,700 nuclear warheads against each other's ground forces and nuclear arsenals in Europe. These weapons included 1- and 5-kiloton artillery shells and a hundred 1-kiloton airborne bombs. It was further assumed that no bombs would be dropped on cities, although some targets, such as armored divisions, might be located in densely populated regions. The UN experts concluded that there would be 5-6 million civilian casualties from the immediate effects of the explosions alone (military casualties would total around 400,000). Another 1.1 million civilians would fall victim to radiation disease and an even larger number would suffer the secondary effects of nuclear war.

How realistic are these estimates? Not very, in our opinion. They assume the extremely precise and controlled use of less than 20 percent of the existing military theater nuclear arsenals and exclude the possibility of accidents and miscalculations. Most importantly, they ignore the constant threat of continuing escalation, either in the form of the use of additional weapons against civilian targets in Europe or in the form of a nuclear exchange between the territories of the United States and the USSR. If millions of people were killed within just a few days, it would be extraordinarily difficult to stop the war. Emotions would override logic. The very momentum of events would destroy all remaining mechanisms for the containment of the conflict. A complete catastrophe would almost certainly engulf us.

Some people argue that nuclear attacks against only the strategic forces of the adversary would result in relatively few civilian casualties and limited damage to industrial and other civilian facilities. This, they allege, raises the possibility that a nuclear war "limited" to strategic forces could be an acceptable alternative. If the casualties from a "counterforce" attack are low, the advocates of this alternative state, the side subjected to the attack would have to refrain from retaliating against the cities and economic facilities of the adversary in the fear of counterretaliation against its own civilian targets, which will cause much greater destruction than the original attack.

The careful study of the consequences of nuclear war "limited" to attacks on the adversary's strategic forces indicates, however, that the prediction of relatively low fatalities is based on unrealistic assumptions. Radiation would be responsible for many more casualties from a "counterforce" strike than from attacks on urban areas. In view of the multitude of potential targets scattered throughout the United States and the USSR, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the movement of radioactive fall-out and its possible effects. Much will depend on the weather, the nature of the attack itself and the degree to which the civilian population has been prepared to take cover from the immediate danger of radiation. For this reason, no official study attempts to estimate total losses, but concerns itself only with outright deaths. Besides this, fatality estimates depend greatly on

whether the attacks are limited to missile silos or if they also include bomber bases and submarine ports. The latter are usually located in or near large urban areas, and attacks on them would therefore result in much larger numbers of fatalities.

Estimates of fatalities resulting from an attack on U.S. strategic forces range from 2 million to 22 million. Furthermore, the lower estimate assumes that the attack is confined to missile sites and that the population takes effective steps to shelter itself from radiation for a sufficient period of time. In view of the fact that most strategic targets are located far away from industrial centers, the effects on the economies of the two countries will not be as great in this case as in an attack on urban areas. Nevertheless, agriculture, livestock and the water supply would be affected over vast areas. Considering the great uncertainty about the radioactive fall-out pattern, it is difficult to estimate all of the ecological consequences, but it is clear that they will be profound and will lead to massive shortages of grain, vegetables, meat and dairy products. Destruction and death on the scale envisaged for a "counterforce exchange" will have a profound impact on both countries. Never in mankind's history has such intense and widespread devastation occurred in such a short period of time. Which society could escape chaos after this kind of destruction? Who can guarantee that political and economic institutions will recover from these shocks? And even if they could, the senseless deaths of millions of citizens, the physical and psychological agony of tens of millions of others and the devastation of agriculture in both countries with incalculable long-term consequences will be a tragedy of unprecedented proportions.

The chapter goes on to discuss the possible consequences of combat operations involving the use of conventional, chemical and biological weapons.

(To be continued)

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